Hydrablog

In Fort Hood aftermath, Pentagon opens two reviews

2009-11-20T21:19:13Z

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/19/AR2009111902528.html
In Fort Hood aftermath, Pentagon opens two reviews
Threat-identification policies, quality of casualty care assessed
By Ann Scott Tyson and Ben Pershing Washington Post Staff Writer Friday, November 20, 2009 [Obama administration] [111th congress, 1st session] [bureaucracy: dod, Pentagon; JAG corps] [attack on troops in garrison] [now that people have had nearly 2 weeks, they are starting to think through some of implications] [followup] [the sad politicization of Fort Hood tragedy] [ditto] [*]
The Pentagon is launching an urgent review of whether military procedures hinder the identification of service members who pose a threat to their fellow troops.
As part of the 45-day investigation, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates ordered an examination of whether Army policies and procedures played any role in failing to prevent

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In Fort Hood aftermath, Pentagon opens two reviews
Threat-identification policies, quality of casualty care assessed
By Ann Scott Tyson and Ben Pershing Washington Post Staff Writer Friday, November 20, 2009 [Obama administration] [111th congress, 1st session] [bureaucracy: dod, Pentagon; JAG corps] [attack on troops in garrison] [now that people have had nearly 2 weeks, they are starting to think through some of implications] [followup] [the sad politicization of Fort Hood tragedy] [ditto] [*]
The Pentagon is launching an urgent review of whether military procedures hinder the identification of service members who pose a threat to their fellow troops.
As part of the 45-day investigation, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates ordered an examination of whether Army policies and procedures played any role in failing to prevent the Fort Hood shootings. The review will also assess medical screening and discharge policies, programs to assess service members before and after they deploy, as well as procedures for reporting "adverse service member information," he said.
Gates also ordered a separate in-depth investigation, lasting four to six months, into potential "systemic institutional shortcomings" in the military services related to care for victims of mass-casualty incidents, the performance of health-care providers and stress on the force.
Word of the Pentagon reviews came on the same day that a Senate committee held the first public hearing on the attack that killed 13 people and wounded dozens at the Army post in Texas.
Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman (I-Conn.), chairman of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, began the hearing by saying he believed the incident was "a terrorist attack." He added that senators wanted "to determine whether that attack could have been prevented, whether the federal agencies and employees involved missed signals or failed to connect the dots."
As more becomes known about the behavior of the suspect, Maj. Nidal M. Hasan, before the shootings, pressure has mounted on the Obama administration and the military to explain why the Army psychiatrist did not warrant further investigation or preemptive action.
U.S. intelligence officials knew last year that Hasan had been corresponding with a radical Islamic cleric; earlier this year investigators learned of Internet postings, allegedly by Hasan, that indicated sympathy for suicide bombers; and colleagues of Hasan's at Walter Reed Army Medical Center said the "intensity" of his embrace of Islam raised concerns among doctors there.
Identifying 'deficiencies'
Gates said the Army's "in-depth, detailed assessment" would look at "whether the Army programs, policies and procedures reasonably would have prevented the shooting." The goal, he said, is "to determine whether, in fact, there were lapses or problems."
The secretary promised "full and open disclosure" of the findings, adding that avoiding "similar tragedies" is imperative.
Togo D. West Jr., the former veterans affairs secretary and Army secretary, and retired Adm. Vernon Clark, a former chief of naval operations, will lead the 45-day review. It will look for "deficiencies" in Pentagon procedures for "identifying service members who could potentially pose credible threats to others," Gates said. [*] [Clark is well respected]
Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, joined Gates at the news conference and said that commanders are responsible for taking necessary action, should service members make radical statements. While not referring to the Hasan case, Mullen said his expectation is "for any commander certainly to be aware of those kinds of things and then to take appropriate action . . . to certainly not sit idly by but to address it." Still, he said, "a single proclamation, if you will, doesn't, in and of itself necessarily mean anything. You've got to put it into the circumstances." [*]
Asked whether he believes management failures in the Army played any role in the Fort Hood shootings, Gates replied, "If there are questions of accountability, the Army would address those internally." He said he was confident in the service's ability to "investigate itself."
Gates called it "disturbing" that Hasan had e-mailed cleric Anwar al-Aulaqi, but the secretary said he wanted to find out "all the facts" before drawing conclusions. Asked whether he would join Lieberman in characterizing the shootings as "a terrorist attack," Gates replied, "I'm just not going to go there." As the senior Pentagon leader, he said, he did not want to be seen as influencing the military criminal judicial process now underway.
Hasan, who is conscious but paralyzed from the waist down, remains in an intensive care unit at Brooke Army Medical Center at Fort Sam Houston, in San Antonio, his attorney said Thursday.
John P. Galligan said the Army has allowed Hasan's legal team to hire a civilian chemist to observe the examination of all evidence related to the shootings as well as any tests involving Hasan.
Galligan said he has requested that the military make funds available for Hasan to hire a private civilian investigator to conduct a probe independent from those of the government. Galligan, a retired colonel and former military judge at Fort Hood, also has requested that the government reinstate his security clearance so that he can review any classified documents relating to his client.
Galligan said that the government has shipped him a box of personnel files and other records related to Hasan and that he expects more records to be made available in the discovery process.
Action on the Hill
The Senate homeland security committee has received only partial cooperation from the Obama administration in its investigation of the attack, with Lieberman rebuffed in his requests to have current officials appear. [gee, I wonder why?] [Grandpa Joe springing into action] [*] But Lieberman said Thursday that the committee had received access to important classified documents, and he sounded cautiously optimistic that the administration would be more forthcoming.
Sen. Susan Collins (Maine), the panel's ranking Republican, recalled the missed opportunities to head off the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. "In the wake of the mass murder at Fort Hood, we must once again confront a troubling question: Was this another failure to connect the dots?" Collins said.
Lieberman emphasized that the panel would seek to answer a few vital questions: What information did the government have on Hasan before the attacks, including e-mails he may have sent? What judgments were made about those e-mails? If the FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Force had vital information on Hasan, was it shared with the Army?
He added that the panel would also examine the perils of homegrown extremism and "political correctness."
Senators heard testimony Thursday from five experts on terrorism and homeland security, several of whom expressed fears that warning signs about Hasan may have been ignored or played down because he is Muslim.
Retired Army Gen. John Keane recalled instances during his career when possible oversensitivity to issues of ethnicity and religion made military leaders blind to potential threats.
"This is not about Muslims and their religion . . . nor is it about the 10,000 Muslims in the military who are, quite frankly, not seen as Muslims but as soldiers, sailors and airmen," Keane said. "This is fundamentally about jihadist extremism, which is at odds with the values of America." [*]
Gates also voiced concern over the possibility that the incident could lead to suspicion against "certain categories of people," apparently referring to Muslims. "In a nation as diverse as the United States, the last thing we need to do is start pointing fingers at each other," he said. [those crying political correctness are typically guilty of the same sort of careful language when its their pet causes; that’s just a silly charge] [did people act lazy; did they pass on a problem to others that should have been fixed before passed; did they cut him slack on Islam; etc, etc. almost certainly yes but that’s not political correctness and it’s foolish to suggest it is] [*] © 2009 The Washington Post Company

Pentagon to Review Shootings at Fort Hood

2009-11-20T21:18:23Z

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/20/us/20inquire.html
November 20, 2009
Pentagon to Review Shootings at Fort Hood
By ELISABETH BUMILLER and DAVID JOHNSTON [Obama administration] [111th congress, 1st session] [bureaucracy: dod, Pentagon; JAG corps] [attack on troops in garrison] [now that people have had nearly 2 weeks, they are starting to think through some of implications] [followup] [the sad politicization of Fort Hood tragedy] [*]
WASHINGTON — Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates on Thursday announced a Pentagon review of the shootings at Ford Hood, Tex., to help ensure, he said, that “nothing like this ever happens again.”

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November 20, 2009
Pentagon to Review Shootings at Fort Hood
By ELISABETH BUMILLER and DAVID JOHNSTON [Obama administration] [111th congress, 1st session] [bureaucracy: dod, Pentagon; JAG corps] [attack on troops in garrison] [now that people have had nearly 2 weeks, they are starting to think through some of implications] [followup] [the sad politicization of Fort Hood tragedy] [*]
WASHINGTON — Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates on Thursday announced a Pentagon review of the shootings at Ford Hood, Tex., to help ensure, he said, that “nothing like this ever happens again.”
A former Army secretary, Togo West, and Adm. Vern Clark, the former chief of naval operations, are to lead the 45-day review.
Hours earlier, a Senate committee opened the first public hearings into the shootings, with several legislators asserting that the Nov. 5 attack, in which an Army psychiatrist is accused of killing 13 people and wounding 43 others, was a terrorist attack by a homegrown extremist who may have slipped past law enforcement and military authorities.
Mr. Gates said the goal of the review was threefold: to find any deficiencies within the Defense Department for identifying service members who might be a threat; to assess the military’s mental health and counseling programs, among others; and to examine how the department responds to “mass casualty” events at its facilities.
“We do not enter this process with any preconceived notions,” Mr. Gates said at a news conference. “However, it is prudent to determine immediately whether there are internal weaknesses or procedural shortcomings in the department that could make us vulnerable in the future.” [*]
He said that the 45-day review was the beginning of extended military reviews of the shootings.
The Army’s chief of staff, Gen. George W. Casey Jr., is organizing a military panel to examine whether warning signs were overlooked by the Army authorities at Fort Hood or the Walter Reed Army Medical Center, where the psychiatrist, Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, was stationed until July.
The 45-day review will shape a longer follow-up Pentagon examination of any institutional shortcomings, Mr. Gates said. The longer Pentagon review would take four to six months, he said.
Mr. Gates, who has so far said little in public about the shootings, described his initial reaction as one of “horror.” He said “the most important thing for us now is to find out what actually happened, put all the facts together and figure out a way where we can do everything possible so that nothing like this ever happens again.”
Asked if he considered the shootings at Fort Hood a terrorist attack by Major Hasan, a Muslim whose opposition to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan appeared to become much more radical in the last several months, Mr. Gates said, “I’m just not going to go there,” and “I am going to wait until the facts are in.”
Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, [what a publicity whore] [*] a Connecticut independent who is chairman of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, said the Congressional hearings would try to determine whether federal agencies and employees “missed signals or failed to connect the dots in a way that enabled Hasan to carry out his deadly plan.”
Mr. Lieberman’s hearing made only limited headway because the Obama administration has refused his requests for witnesses from the F.B.I. and the Defense Department.
Mr. Lieberman said he had spoken with Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. and Mr. Gates, who told him they would cooperate with his inquiry, but did not want to compromise the criminal investigation.
As a result, Mr. Lieberman proceeded with several nongovernment experts and former officials, including Frances Fragos Townsend, formerly the homeland security adviser to President George W. Bush.
Ms. Townsend expressed concern that “political correctness” and fear of intruding on Major Hasan’s free speech rights might have interfered with the sharing of information earlier this year, when an F.B.I.-led counterterrorism team examined his e-mail exchanges with Anwar al-Awlaki, a well-known radical Islamist cleric, but found nothing amiss.
Mr. Gates said that he found Major Hasan’s contact with Mr. Awlaki “disturbing,” but “before I draw any conclusion about it I want to find out all the facts.”
Copyright 2009 The New York Times Company

Air Defense Push Inspired by 9/11 Gets a 2nd Look

2009-11-20T21:17:37Z

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/20/us/20terror.html
November 20, 2009
Air Defense Push Inspired by 9/11 Gets a 2nd Look
By THOM SHANKER and ERIC SCHMITT
COLORADO SPRINGS — The commander of military forces protecting North America has ordered a review of the costly air defenses intended to prevent another Sept. 11-style terrorism attack, an assessment aimed at determining whether the commitment of jet fighters, other aircraft and crews remains justified. [*] [good; they should always be reviewing cost-effectiveness]
Senior officers involved in the effort say the assessment is to gauge the likelihood that terrorists may succeed in hijacking an airliner or flying their own smaller craft into the United States or Canada. The study is focused on circumstances in which the attack would be aimed not at a public building or landmark but instead at a power plant or a critical link

]]> http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/20/us/20terror.html
November 20, 2009
Air Defense Push Inspired by 9/11 Gets a 2nd Look
By THOM SHANKER and ERIC SCHMITT
COLORADO SPRINGS — The commander of military forces protecting North America has ordered a review of the costly air defenses intended to prevent another Sept. 11-style terrorism attack, an assessment aimed at determining whether the commitment of jet fighters, other aircraft and crews remains justified. [*] [good; they should always be reviewing cost-effectiveness]
Senior officers involved in the effort say the assessment is to gauge the likelihood that terrorists may succeed in hijacking an airliner or flying their own smaller craft into the United States or Canada. The study is focused on circumstances in which the attack would be aimed not at a public building or landmark but instead at a power plant or a critical link in the nation’s financial network, like a major electrical grid or a computer network hub.
The review, to be completed next spring, is expected to be the military’s most thorough reassessment of the threat of a terrorism attack by air since Al Qaeda’s strikes on Sept. 11, 2001, transformed a Defense Department focused on fighting other militaries and led to the Bush administration’s “global war on terror.” [*]
The assessment is partly a reflection of how a military straining to fight two wars is questioning whether it makes sense to keep in place the costly system of protections established after those attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Though the last of the air patrols above American cities were discontinued in 2007, the military keeps dozens of warplanes and hundreds of air crew members on alert to respond to potential threats.
“The fighter force is extremely expensive, so you always have to ask yourself the question ‘How much is enough?’ ” said Maj. Gen. Pierre J. Forgues of Canada, director of operations for the North American Aerospace Defense Command, or Norad, which carries out the air defense mission within the United States military’s Northern Command.
Norad, based here in Colorado Springs, will try to determine in its review whether the United States is safer today. Military strategists and operations officers have been asked to address whether the security measures put in place since 2001 have diminished the threat of terrorist attack by aircraft to such an extent that a smaller commitment of combat jets and personnel is now warranted.
Officers conducting the review said that a number of security steps adopted in the last eight years should be factored into whether to sustain the air defense mission at current levels. Among those steps are screening measures at airports; the addition of armored, locked cockpit doors on commercial planes; much tighter restrictions on airspace around Washington; and a host of law enforcement and intelligence operations to identify and track potential terrorists and prevent them from boarding airliners.
“The ability of terrorists to do what they did on 9/11 has been greatly curtailed,” General Forgues (pronounced forgs) said in an interview at his headquarters here. “But, as has been said, we would be concerned by the lack of imagination. And so we do not want to view the defense posture strictly in terms of threat. We want to view the defense posture in terms of vulnerability as well.”
He said the assessment would look at schemes different from those carried out by the Sept. 11 hijackers and would include reviewing the vulnerability of the nation’s communications infrastructure, power generation and distributions networks, and financial infrastructure to a kamikaze-style attack.
Gen. Victor E. Renuart Jr., the head of Norad and Northern Command, ordered the review in response to criticism this year by the Government Accountability Office that the command had failed to conduct “routine risk assessments.” General Renuart expanded the scope of the review “to refine how we allocate and request resources today,” said the commands’ spokesman, James Graybeal.
The exact number of warplanes assigned to defending American territory, and the bases where they remain on alert, are classified. [*]But while the Defense Department has acknowledged some past changes in the mission, as when it eliminated 24-hour combat air patrols over New York and Washington in 2002, senior officers say the resource commitment to the mission and the alert posture for fighter jets and pilots have not changed since the 2001 attacks.
General Forgues said the American and Canadian fleets of fighters, refueling tankers and radar planes “are always in high demand and low supply.”
“Now more than ever,” he said of the current extra stress on the force, “is the need to rationalize what we’re doing and what we’re investing in those areas.”
General Forgues cautioned that there was no predetermined outcome of the review and that it was possible the commitment to the air defense mission would remain the same, or even increase.
Statistics provided by Norad show that in 2008, there were more than 1,000 instances of suspicious air activity. Of those, about 400 required a response from Norad, ranging from putting crews on higher ground alert to actually scrambling jet fighters, which were sent aloft in more than 200 of those incidents.
The combat air patrols over American cities are now used only for drills and for special events like presidential inaugurations and the Super Bowl. But at their peak in the aftermath of Sept. 11, the missions cost $50 million a week and required the assignment of about 11,000 Air Force personnel and 250 planes: fighters, refueling tankers and airborne radar.
By comparison, no more than 14 aircraft at seven bases had been on alert before those attacks to defend American territory against what had become an increasingly unlikely prospect: a strike by Russian warplanes.
Copyright 2009 The New York Times Company

Clinton Seen as Obama’s Key Link to Afghan Leader

2009-11-20T21:16:54Z

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/20/world/asia/20clinton.html
November 20, 2009
Diplomatic Memo
Clinton Seen as Obama’s Key Link to Afghan Leader
By MARK LANDLER [Obama white house] [111th congress, 1st session] [gsave] [Obama’s president-NSC-policymaking model and early info on process, operations] [incredible leaks in past week or so] [now Obama’s staff are fighting over it—or at least they are content to have that appearance?] [Gates threatened the gods’ wrath on leakers last week] [*]
KABUL, Afghanistan — It is far from clear that President Obama can depend on President Hamid Karzai to bring order to this violent country, but it is becoming clear that he will depend on Hillary Rodham Clinton to be his go-between in dealing with the mercurial Afghan leader.
In a visit to Kabul, during which she held a 90-minute, one-on-one session with Mr. Karzai

]]> http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/20/world/asia/20clinton.html
November 20, 2009
Diplomatic Memo
Clinton Seen as Obama’s Key Link to Afghan Leader
By MARK LANDLER [Obama white house] [111th congress, 1st session] [gsave] [Obama’s president-NSC-policymaking model and early info on process, operations] [incredible leaks in past week or so] [now Obama’s staff are fighting over it—or at least they are content to have that appearance?] [Gates threatened the gods’ wrath on leakers last week] [*]
KABUL, Afghanistan — It is far from clear that President Obama can depend on President Hamid Karzai to bring order to this violent country, but it is becoming clear that he will depend on Hillary Rodham Clinton to be his go-between in dealing with the mercurial Afghan leader.
In a visit to Kabul, during which she held a 90-minute, one-on-one session with Mr. Karzai on Wednesday, and in an intense telephone call a few weeks ago in the aftermath of Afghanistan’s election, Secretary of State Clinton has built an unlikely rapport with the Afghan leader, according to administration officials.
It is a new and risky role for Mrs. Clinton — one that thrusts her into the thick of the administration’s most critical international problem, but that also hitches her reputation to a leader who has often proved unreliable. If Mr. Karzai lets down the White House again, Mrs. Clinton, as his principal intermediary with the administration, could find herself damaged along with him.
Mrs. Clinton, who got to know Mr. Karzai in 2005 when she took him to Fort Drum in upstate New York to thank American veterans of the Afghan war, seems to recognize the potential dangers.
“When I came into the administration, I was one of the few people who had a long-term positive relationship with President Karzai,” Mrs. Clinton said in an interview on Thursday, hours after seeing him get sworn in. “I continue to believe he has a tremendous historical opportunity.”
But she quickly added, “That doesn’t mean you make excuses for behavior that you want to see changed; you constantly push back.” In the meeting this week, a senior official said, she bluntly warned Mr. Karzai to crack down on corruption or risk losing American aid.
Her rapport with Mr. Karzai puts her in a distinct minority among senior American officials, some of whom have either clashed with him or, as in the case of Mr. Obama, never developed a relationship with him.
With Mr. Obama planning to announce his decision soon on sending more troops to Afghanistan, Mrs. Clinton has emerged, for better or worse, as the senior official best placed to push Mr. Karzai to help make that policy work. Mr. Karzai appears to appreciate the relationship; he moved up the date of his inauguration to accommodate her schedule, a senior American official said.
As Mr. Karzai begins his new term, Mrs. Clinton has worked to avoid a hectoring tone in her public comments about him. American officials had done too much of that in the past, she said.
Shortly before Mr. Obama took office, Vice President-elect Joseph R. Biden Jr. stalked out of a meeting with Mr. Karzai. More recently, Mr. Karzai reacted badly when the administration’s special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard C. Holbrooke, asked him what he would do if a runoff election became necessary after the initial round of voting in August.
The American ambassador, Karl W. Eikenberry, has a workable relationship with Mr. Karzai, officials said. But the two have also had their ups and downs, and anyway, some American officials say the White House needs an interlocutor at a higher level than an ambassador, or even a special envoy, like Mr. Holbrooke.
President George W. Bush used to conduct regular video conference calls with Mr. Karzai from the White House. When Mr. Obama stopped the practice, officials said, it left Mr. Karzai hurt and bewildered.
“It is critical Obama develops a channel to Karzai where hard messages can go both ways,” said Bruce O. Riedel, who helped the administration formulate its initial Afghan policy. “It is time-consuming, but we can’t hope to succeed without a political channel that works.”
Mrs. Clinton “combines the hard-headed strength, the political clout and the human understanding to do it right,” said Mr. Riedel, who is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.
Of those qualities, her political bona fides may be the most relevant. When Mr. Karzai was wavering about whether to allow a runoff vote after almost a million of his votes were disqualified, she implored him to acquiesce, arguing that he would emerge with a stronger hand. (In the end, Mr. Karzai’s rival, Abdullah Abdullah, pulled out, making a second round unnecessary.)
In case Mr. Karzai did not get her point, Mrs. Clinton reminded him of her own bitter experience in the 2008 Democratic primaries, losing to Mr. Obama, who later named her the nation’s chief diplomat.
“One of the ways that I talk with President Karzai is in very political terms, because I understand that in politics, you’ve got to make some tough compromises sometimes,” she said.
American officials failed to make allowances for his circumstances in trying to govern an unruly country, she said. “We were trying to hold him to a standard that was not in sync with the historical standard.”
When Mr. Karzai first took office in 2002, she noted, there were one million students in Afghanistan, virtually all boys. Today, there are seven million, 40 percent of them girls. She said Mr. Karzai deserved some credit for that, as well as for other advances during his tenure.
Mrs. Clinton also noted that the United States was hardly a perfect candidate to demand a crackdown on corruption.
Asked about reports in The New York Times that the C.I.A. made payments to a brother of Mr. Karzai, Ahmed Wali Karzai, who is suspected of involvement in the drug trade, Mrs. Clinton did not respond directly, but said, “Every country makes compromises, and it behooves you to be humble about pointing fingers.”
“It also is a reminder that we have to do more to support his campaign against corruption,” she added. “We have to facilitate, not impede, the removal and even prosecution of those who are corrupt.”
With Hamid Karzai around for the foreseeable future, the administration has little choice but to accommodate him. So Mrs. Clinton looked for praiseworthy lines in Mr. Karzai’s inaugural speech. If he delivers, she said, he can expect American support for years to come.
“I would imagine, if things go well, that we would be helping with the education and health systems and agriculture productivity long after the military presence had either diminished or disappeared,” she said.
Copyright 2009 The New York Times Company

Arrests in Chicago drive home global nature of terrorism threat

2009-11-20T21:15:59Z

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/19/AR2009111904061.html
Arrests in Chicago drive home global nature of terrorism threat
By Peter Slevin and Spencer S. Hsu Washington Post Staff Writer Friday, November 20, 2009 [Obama white house] [111th congress, 1st session] [gsave] [home-grown, of a sort in any case, jihadis?] [he’s actually a Canadian but he lives here] [apparently were prepared to attack a third nation-state] [new profile?] [*]
CHICAGO -- David C. Headley, a peripatetic Chicagoan accused of scouting potential terrorism targets in India and plotting to kill two Danish journalists, was not always David C. Headley.
Until 2006, he was Daood Gilani, but he told investigators he had changed his name to raise

]]> http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/19/AR2009111904061.html
Arrests in Chicago drive home global nature of terrorism threat
By Peter Slevin and Spencer S. Hsu Washington Post Staff Writer Friday, November 20, 2009 [Obama white house] [111th congress, 1st session] [gsave] [home-grown, of a sort in any case, jihadis?] [he’s actually a Canadian but he lives here] [apparently were prepared to attack a third nation-state] [new profile?] [*]
CHICAGO -- David C. Headley, a peripatetic Chicagoan accused of scouting potential terrorism targets in India and plotting to kill two Danish journalists, was not always David C. Headley.
Until 2006, he was Daood Gilani, but he told investigators he had changed his name to raise less suspicion when he traveled abroad. He lived anonymously in an apartment leased in the name of a dead person. He changed e-mail accounts often and spoke in code on the telephone.
The strategy worked less than perfectly, according to the FBI, which arrested him on terrorism charges last month at O'Hare International Airport on the first leg of a trip to Pakistan. In his luggage were digital videos he took of a Danish newspaper office and a book titled "How to Pray Like a Jew."
Headley and Chicago businessman Tahawwur Hussain Rana are suspected Islamist militants charged not with targeting the United States, but with staging foreign operations from relative anonymity on American soil. Their profile is a fresh one, and it is being viewed by U.S. authorities with alarm. [*]
One counterterrorism official described as "eye-opening" an investigation that concluded the two men worked with two Pakistan-based terrorist organizations allied with al-Qaeda, Lashkar-i-Taiba and Harkat-e-Jihad-e-Islami. It is a reminder, others said, that al-Qaeda or its imitators continue to try to build a network of operatives inside the United States. [I just watched HBO’s special on Mumbai and Lashkar has clearly morphed into serious global jihadis threat] [I’m not sure its goal presently a spectacular attack on the US but it would clearly like to inflict as much pain on US as possible] [I was struck by how illiterate the foot soldier were] [al qaeda, by contrast, has relatively well educated folks or at least it uses many (though it uses some poor, disposed, etc.)] [*]
The case "stands our counterterrorism approach on its head," said Rep. Jane Harman (D-Calif.), chairman of a Homeland Security subcommittee on intelligence. "We've been looking for people who want to attack us, whether foreign or U.S. persons, in the United States. We haven't really been looking at U.S. persons who want to attack other countries."
Several American officials saw an echo of the case against Najibullah Zazi, a Denver airport shuttle driver accused in September of training with al-Qaeda in Pakistan and plotting a backpack bombing in New York.
A U.S. law enforcement official said investigators are tracking several suspects in the Zazi case, mostly in the United States. A counterterrorism official said the investigation into Headley's domestic contacts remains open and active.
Mumbai attacks
One of Headley's alleged Lashkar-i-Taiba associates was arrested in Pakistan this summer, and the U.S. case has triggered a broad investigation in India. Government authorities there suspect Headley played a role in advance of the November 2008 terrorist assault on Mumbai and may have been working on future operations, [*]as the FBI alleges.
Indian police say they think Headley scouted Mumbai targets, including a cafe and two upscale hotels that drew fire in the coordinated attack, which left 165 people dead. He also allegedly posed as a Jew to visit Chabad House, the site of an Orthodox Jewish center also targeted that day. [wow] [*]
The investigation of Headley and Rana captured telephone conversations and e-mails with Pakistani militants, according to court documents in Chicago. Among Headley's associates was Ilyas Kashmiri, a leader of Harkat-e-Jihad-e-Islami. [*]
Attorneys for Headley and Rana declined to discuss recent developments or FBI reports that Headley is now cooperating with U.S. authorities. Lawyer Patrick W. Blegen has told reporters that Rana, a Canadian citizen born in Pakistan, is not guilty and looks forward to answering the charges in court. [*]
Blending in
Headley, 49, and Rana, 48, met as students in a military school in the Pakistani town of Hasan Abdal. Decades later on Chicago's far North Side, Rana is considered a well-connected businessman on Devon Avenue, a bustling corridor crowded with shops owned by residents of Pakistani and Indian heritage.
Before his October arrest, Rana ran his businesses, including a rural Illinois farm that slaughters lambs and goats according to Islamic law, from a cluttered storefront on Devon called First World Immigration Services. He provided space to Raymond J. Sanders, an American immigration lawyer.
"He's an excellent and all-around gentleman who has many business interests," said Sanders, who described Rana as a non-practicing medical doctor "very active in the community." He said Rana focused on clients seeking immigration status in Canada.
Headley appeared in the office sporadically, according to Sanders.
"He came in, talked to people, talked to Dr. Rana, worked on the computer a little bit and didn't say a lot," Sanders said. "He bounced in and out and did his business with Rana."
Rana is charged with "providing material support" to conspirators who plotted to "murder and maim." The FBI contends that Rana supported Headley -- who allegedly used the immigration business as a front -- in a plot to murder a Danish cartoonist and editor connected to the 2005 publication of cartoons lampooning militant Islamists.
According to the charges, Rana lied to a former classmate and official in Pakistan's Chicago consulate in an attempt to get a five-year visa for Headley.
News of the investigation broke in dramatic fashion in Kinsman, Ill., the small town 80 miles southwest of Chicago where Rana owns a farm. One day in October, scores of federal agents backed by an armed helicopter swept into town and searched the property.
When the residents of Kinsman, population 100, learned about the arrest, they said they started wondering about the Muslims who had appeared on Fridays at the farm to pray and buy halal meat.
"They could be terrorists -- it did cross my mind," Mayor Mark Harlow said.
William Rodosky, 72, who once owned the farm, calls himself "dumbfounded." He started getting to know Rana years ago and considered him "a polite, respectful, well-dressed man and a good businessman."
"This is a small-town farming community," Rodosky said. "It's something the FBI will take care of. No one's going to be blowing anything up around here."
Hsu reported from Washington. Staff writer Kari Lydersen in Kinsman and correspondent Emily Wax in New Delhi contributed to this report. © 2009 The Washington Post Company

A softer approach to Karzai

2009-11-20T21:15:05Z

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/19/AR2009111903992.html
A softer approach to Karzai
New warmth from U.S. is acknowledgment that Afghan leader is needed as partner
By Rajiv Chandrasekaran Washington Post Staff Writer Friday, November 20, 2009 [Obama white house] [111th congress, 1st session] [gsave] [Obama’s president-NSC-policymaking model and early info on process, operations] [incredible leaks in past week or so] [now Obama’s staff are fighting over it—or at least they are content to have that appearance?] [Gates threatened the gods’ wrath on leakers last week] [*]
When a team of senior U.S. officials led by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton entered the presidential palace in Kabul on Wednesday for a dinner meeting, they had little indication of what Afghan President Hamid Karzai planned to discuss, or whether questions about corruption and governance would pitch their host into a foul mood.
But instead of revisiting old disputes, Karzai brought in several cabinet ministers to talk

]]> http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/19/AR2009111903992.html
A softer approach to Karzai
New warmth from U.S. is acknowledgment that Afghan leader is needed as partner
By Rajiv Chandrasekaran Washington Post Staff Writer Friday, November 20, 2009 [Obama white house] [111th congress, 1st session] [gsave] [Obama’s president-NSC-policymaking model and early info on process, operations] [incredible leaks in past week or so] [now Obama’s staff are fighting over it—or at least they are content to have that appearance?] [Gates threatened the gods’ wrath on leakers last week] [*]
When a team of senior U.S. officials led by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton entered the presidential palace in Kabul on Wednesday for a dinner meeting, they had little indication of what Afghan President Hamid Karzai planned to discuss, or whether questions about corruption and governance would pitch their host into a foul mood.
But instead of revisiting old disputes, Karzai brought in several cabinet ministers to talk about development and security. He explained details of a new effort to address graft. And halfway through a meal of lamb stew, chicken and rice, he looked across the table and said he had decided that the United States would be a "critical partner" in his second term, according to a senior U.S. official familiar with the meeting.
The Americans also turned on the charm. Clinton, wearing an embroidered floral coat she had purchased on an earlier trip to Afghanistan, told stories of her time in Arkansas and in the Senate, and listened with interest as the Afghans detailed how they recently exported 12 tons of apples to India by air.
As President Obama nears a decision on how many more troops he will dispatch to Afghanistan, his top diplomats and generals are abandoning for now their get-tough tactics with Karzai and attempting to forge a far warmer relationship. They recognize that their initial strategy may have done more harm than good, fueling stress and anger in a beleaguered, conspiracy-minded leader whom the U.S. government needs as a partner.
"It's not sustainable to have a 'War of the Roses' relationship here, where . . . we basically throw things at each other," said another senior administration official, one of more than a dozen U.S. and Afghan government officials interviewed for this article. They spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss internal policy deliberations.
The new approach, which one official described as a "reset" of the relationship, will entail more engagement with members of Karzai's cabinet and provincial governors, officials said, because they have concluded that the Afghan president lacks the political clout in his highly decentralized nation to purge corrupt local warlords and power brokers. The CIA has sent a longtime field officer close to Karzai to be the new station chief in Kabul. And State Department envoy Richard C. Holbrooke, whose aggressive style has infuriated the Afghan leader at times, is devoting more attention to shaping policy in Washington and marshaling international support for reconstruction and development programs.
The tension in the relationship stems from the cumulative impact of several White House decisions that were intended to improve the quality of the Afghan government. When Obama became president, he discontinued his predecessor's practice of holding bimonthly videoconferences with Karzai. Obama granted wide latitude to the hard-charging Holbrooke to pressure Karzai to tackle the corruption and mismanagement that have fueled the Taliban's rise. The administration also indicated that it wanted many candidates to challenge Karzai in the August presidential election.
Although there is broad agreement among Obama's national security team that Karzai has been an ineffective leader, a growing number of top officials have begun to question in recent months whether those actions wound up goading him into doing exactly what the White House did not want: forging alliances with former warlords, letting drug traffickers out of prison and threatening to sack competent ministers. Those U.S. officials now think that Karzai, a tactically shrewd tribal chieftain who is under enormous stress as he seeks to placate and balance rival factions in his government, may operate best when he does not feel besieged.
Criticism of the Obama administration's manner of dealing with Karzai has been most pronounced among senior military officials, who question why the State Department has not dispatched more civilians to help the Afghan leader fix the government or worked more intensively with him to achieve U.S. goals.
"We've been treating Karzai like [Slobodan] Milosevic," a senior Pentagon official said, referring to the former Bosnian Serb leader whom Holbrooke pressured into accepting a peace treaty in the 1990s. "That's not a model that will work in Afghanistan."
Fueling tensions
Karzai's first indication that his relationship with the United States would undergo a profound shift occurred 10 days before Obama's inauguration. Vice President-elect Joseph R. Biden Jr. had come to the palace for dinner, and halfway through the meal, he began taking his host to task for how he was responding to civilian casualties caused by U.S. and NATO military operations. [*]
Biden told Karzai that he was politicizing the issue and leveling "ill-founded" allegations in public, according to a previously undisclosed account of the dinner from a person who attended. Karzai argued back, and the discussion turned tense. "Biden got a little bit passionate about it," the participant said. "Karzai was taken aback, and he got a little bit passionate, too." [*]
Clinton further stoked tensions during her confirmation hearing three days later by calling Afghanistan a "narco-state" with a government "plagued by limited capacity and widespread corruption." When Holbrooke was appointed Obama's special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan the following week, the diplomat made little secret of his desire to see others challenge Karzai in the election. In State Department meetings and Washington cocktail parties, he talked up Ashraf Ghani, a former World Bank official who speaks eloquently about the need to address corruption but has only a small political base in Afghanistan.
At the time, others in the administration were equally harsh in their assessment of Karzai. One senior official remarked that he had "plateaued as a leader," and the classified version of a White House review of Afghanistan strategy implied, according to two officials who read it, a lack of support for Karzai's reelection. Holbrooke and others openly discussed plans to send U.S. development assistance directly to provincial governors and cabinet ministers.
Back then, top administration officials thought that increasing pressure on Karzai would lead him to take meaningful steps to reduce corruption and improve governance. The officials also hoped to encourage potential rivals to run against Karzai by sending a clear signal that he was no longer Washington's man.
Neither assumption played out as planned. Karzai recoiled at the demands, his advisers said, in part because he resented being told what to do but also because he thought that Obama administration officials overestimated his control of the country. There also have been conflicting U.S. messages: While Biden and others pressed Karzai to remove his brother as the chairman of the provincial council in Kandahar because of allegations that he is connected to drug trafficking, the CIA continued to pay him for sharing intelligence and assisting with counterterrorism operations, according to a U.S. official with knowledge of intelligence operations in Afghanistan.
The U.S. approach to the election had the unintended consequence of strengthening Karzai's hand. "Nobody wanted to coalesce around a single candidate because they each thought they were America's favorite," said Ali Jalali, a former interior minister who briefly considered running.
Karzai was able to pull key opposition figures to his side by promising them positions in the new government. Fear that he no longer had U.S. support also prompted him to name Mohammed Fahim, a prominent former warlord alleged to have been involved in drug smuggling and corruption, as one of his vice presidential candidates.
"We created a political-diplomatic isometric exercise," said Ronald Neumann, a former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan. "The more we pressed him to remove people, the more he thought we were trying to undercut him, and we drove him back to the worst actors for support."
By the May 8 filing deadline, it was clear to many in Washington that Karzai would almost certainly win a second term. But there was no substantive effort to recalibrate the relationship. Although the administration maintained a neutral stance with regard to the election, Karzai saw it differently, according to his advisers.
"He was sure," one said, "that Washington wanted him to lose."
Disputed election
On Aug. 21, the day after Afghanistan's election, Holbrooke and U.S. Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry visited Karzai in a wood-paneled room in his Kabul palace to discuss the election and how Karzai would govern if he won.
Although only a small fraction of the ballots had been counted, and widespread reports of fraud were reaching the capital, Karzai told the Americans he believed he had prevailed.
"The votes haven't been counted yet," Holbrooke told Karzai, according to a U.S. official familiar with the exchange.
Karzai brushed him off. "I've won," he said.
Holbrooke moved on to other subjects, but he soon returned to the election. He asked Karzai how he would react if he did not receive a majority of votes. But one Afghan official asserted to journalists that Holbrooke pushed Karzai to agree to a second round before all of the ballots were counted. Although Holbrooke and Eikenberry stayed until dinner was finished, the meeting ended in acrimony.
Karzai later sought to call Obama to complain. But White House aides, who deemed the Afghan leader's ploy inappropriate, said he was unavailable. Karzai then tried to reach Clinton. He received the same response.
Karzai was left seething, one of his advisers said.
"Looking back on it now, I believe it was a genuine misunderstanding," Holbrooke said.
By mid-October, when it became clear that the number of votes disqualified because of suspected fraud would push him below 50 percent, the administration scrambled for a way to get Karzai to agree to a second round. Holbrooke could not go because the relationship was still too raw, and Clinton said she wanted him in Washington to participate in Afghanistan strategy meetings. The administration pressed into service Senate Foreign Relations Chairman John F. Kerry (D-Mass.), who was traveling in the region.
It took more than 20 hours of talks over four days, but Kerry persuaded Karzai to accede to the runoff. To critics of the forceful approach, the senator showed that patient diplomacy -- drinking copious cups of tea, flattering his ego and going for long walks in the palace garden -- could still get Karzai to bend.
"You have to show him respect and consideration," said Zalmay Khalilzad, a Bush administration envoy to Afghanistan who remains close to Karzai. "You cannot lecture him. You have to listen to his explanations, why he thinks something cannot be done, and then respond to that in a constructive way."
New expectations
Administration officials involved in shaping the strategy insist that it was not possible to recalibrate their approach to Karzai until the election and the ensuing disputes over ballot-box stuffing had concluded. This period "was a tremendous drain on the relationship," said the senior official familiar with Wednesday's meeting.
In the meantime, U.S. officials also have adjusted their expectations of what Karzai can accomplish.
"This top-down thing where you go to the palace and say, 'You've got to fix this, got to fix that. Please, Mr. President.' He agrees to do things almost every time and they don't get done. Then we think it's because he's being obstructionist," the senior official said. But we cannot "expect him to solve things which he can't solve."
Administration officials are also hopeful that the CIA's new station chief in Kabul will be an influential voice in encouraging Karzai to address U.S. concerns. The chief, who was most recently based in a Middle Eastern nation, led a team that supported Karzai's effort to work with tribal elders to reclaim control of his native Uruzgan province from the Taliban in November 2001, according to two people with knowledge of intelligence operations in the country. The sources said that Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, was in favor of sending the officer to Kabul. The CIA declined to comment.
Despite the changes, administration officials maintain that they are not going soft on Karzai. Clinton, they said, told the Afghan leader in a 90-minute private meeting after the dinner that future levels of development aid will be linked to improvements in governance, and she urged him to use merit, not cronyism, as a criteria for filling cabinet posts. She also indicated that the White House would seek to have the Afghan government meet as-yet-defined benchmarks of progress as a condition of U.S. security and development assistance.
"There's no diminution of concern," the senior official said. "But she did it within the context of a different tone."
In public comments after Karzai's inaugural speech, in which he pledged to address corruption by ordering government officials to disclose their assets and establishing a major-crimes tribunal, Clinton praised his specificity but noted that she wanted to see results. She said: "We're going to -- along with the people of Afghanistan -- watch very carefully as to how that's implemented." © 2009 The Washington Post Company

Republicans Seek Inquiry on Fort Hood

2009-11-20T21:14:06Z

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/18/us/18hood.html
November 18, 2009
Republicans Seek Inquiry on Fort Hood
By SCOTT SHANE and DAVID JOHNSTON [Obama administration] [111th congress, 1st session] [bureaucracy: dod, Pentagon; JAG corps] [attack on troops in garrison] [now that people have had nearly 2 weeks, they are starting to think through some of implications] [followup] [the sad politicization of Fort Hood tragedy] [*]
WASHINGTON — Republicans on the House Intelligence Committee on Tuesday called for an immediate Congressional investigation of what they called systemic intelligence failures before the shootings at Fort Hood on Nov. 5, saying the Obama administration was trying to block a full inquiry.
Democrats, after a briefing on the case for Congressional leaders, replied that with the Army and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the early stages of a criminal investigation,

]]> http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/18/us/18hood.html
November 18, 2009
Republicans Seek Inquiry on Fort Hood
By SCOTT SHANE and DAVID JOHNSTON [Obama administration] [111th congress, 1st session] [bureaucracy: dod, Pentagon; JAG corps] [attack on troops in garrison] [now that people have had nearly 2 weeks, they are starting to think through some of implications] [followup] [the sad politicization of Fort Hood tragedy] [*]
WASHINGTON — Republicans on the House Intelligence Committee on Tuesday called for an immediate Congressional investigation of what they called systemic intelligence failures before the shootings at Fort Hood on Nov. 5, saying the Obama administration was trying to block a full inquiry.
Democrats, after a briefing on the case for Congressional leaders, replied that with the Army and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the early stages of a criminal investigation, it was too early for Congress to begin its own inquiry.
The committee’s Republicans, led by Peter Hoekstra of Michigan, wrote to the House speaker, Nancy Pelosi, saying there were indications of “significant intelligence and intelligence sharing failures that must be reviewed and addressed immediately.” [*]
But in an interview, the committee’s Democratic chairman, Silvestre Reyes of Texas, called the Republican statements “political grandstanding” and said Congress should not get in the way of the investigation of Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, 39, the Army psychiatrist who is accused in the shootings.
Mr. Reyes said the committee would perform its oversight duties but would first wait for more facts to emerge.
“Before you rush off, you want to know what direction to go in,” he said.
Officials have disclosed that Major Hasan sent about a dozen e-mail messages late last year and early this year to a radical Muslim cleric in Yemen, Anwar al-Awlaki. [*]
American intelligence agencies intercepted the e-mail messages and a Defense Department analyst on a terrorism task force reviewed them last spring but decided not to seek a full investigation.
The texts of the messages have been provided to the Intelligence Committees in the House and Senate.
One Congressional official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said Tuesday that the messages “were not overtly aggressive” but “should have raised flags.”
The Army and the F.B.I. are to report their findings to the White House, where the National Security Council is overseeing a broader inquiry into possible government missteps that is expected to conclude Nov. 30.
Copyright 2009 The New York Times Company

Obama Says He Is Close to Afghan War Decision

2009-11-20T21:13:14Z

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/19/world/asia/19prexy.html
November 19, 2009
Obama Says He Is Close to Afghan War Decision
By HELENE COOPER [Obama white house] [111th congress, 1st session] [gsave] [Obama’s president-NSC-policymaking model and early info on process, operations] [incredible leaks in past week or so] [now Obama’s staff are fighting over it—or at least they are content to have that appearance?] [Gates threatened the gods’ wrath on leakers last week] [*]
BEIJING — President Obama said Wednesday he was “very close to a decision” on a troop increase for the war in Afghanistan and would make his case to the American people for his Afghan strategy in the next “several weeks.”
“I am very confident that when I announce the decision, the American people will have a lot of clarity about what we’re doing, how we’re going to succeed, how much this thing is going to cost,” Mr. Obama told CNN in an interview at his hotel in Beijing. Most important, he said,

]]> http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/19/world/asia/19prexy.html
November 19, 2009
Obama Says He Is Close to Afghan War Decision
By HELENE COOPER [Obama white house] [111th congress, 1st session] [gsave] [Obama’s president-NSC-policymaking model and early info on process, operations] [incredible leaks in past week or so] [now Obama’s staff are fighting over it—or at least they are content to have that appearance?] [Gates threatened the gods’ wrath on leakers last week] [*]
BEIJING — President Obama said Wednesday he was “very close to a decision” on a troop increase for the war in Afghanistan and would make his case to the American people for his Afghan strategy in the next “several weeks.”
“I am very confident that when I announce the decision, the American people will have a lot of clarity about what we’re doing, how we’re going to succeed, how much this thing is going to cost,” Mr. Obama told CNN in an interview at his hotel in Beijing. Most important, he said, was that he was asking “what’s the end game on this thing, which I think is something that, unless you impose that kind of discipline, could end up leading to a multiyear occupation that won’t serve the interests of the United States.”
Mr. Obama said that his “preference” on Afghanistan “would be not to hand off anything to the next president,” but did not indicate if that meant he planned to pull out most American troops by 2012. “We have a vital interest in making sure that Afghanistan is sufficiently stable, that it can’t infect the entire region with violent extremism.”
He said that Afghan President Hamid Karzai “has served his country in important ways,” but added that he has some weaknesses.
Mr. Obama’s comments came as part of a series of interviews he conducted with the major American television networks from his hotel in Beijing on his last day in China. He arrived in Seoul, South Korea, the final stop on his Asian trip, on Wednesday afternoon.
During his three-day visit, Mr. Obama has stressed that because China and the United States are the largest energy consumers and among the largest economies, few global problems can be solved without their agreement to cooperate.
Before leaving Beijing, he met with Prime Minister Wen Jiabao.
According to China Daily, the government’s main English-language newspaper, Mr. Wen said that a deeper relationship with the United States “can play a unique role in advancing the establishment of the new international political and economic order, as well as promoting world peace.”
But he dismissed any notion of a so- called G-2 alliance to address the world’s problems, saying it ran counter to China’s policy of not aligning with any nation. Nor was China advanced enough to assume a key role in global affairs, he suggested.
China is still a developing nation with huge problems, Xinhua, the official Chinese news agency, quoted Mr. Wen as saying, and “we must always keep sober-minded over it.”
Mr. Wen said China did not seek a trade surplus with the United States and wanted to balance flows, striking a conciliatory note but avoiding public comment on currency rifts, Reuters reported. Mr. Wen’s comments during the meeting were posted on the Chinese Foreign Ministry Web site.
“China does not pursue a trade surplus,” Mr. Wen said, adding that his government wants “to encourage a steady balancing of bilateral trade,” according to Reuters. “Lively global trade and investment will help to overcome the international financial crisis and accelerate global economic recovery.”
China has come under heavy pressure, not only from the United States but also from Europe and several Asian countries, to revise its policy of keeping its currency, the renminbi, pegged at an artificially low value against the dollar to help promote its exports. Some economists say China must take that step to prevent the return of large trade and financial imbalances that may have contributed to the recent financial crisis.
In Seoul, Mr. Obama is expected to discuss trade, as well as efforts to get North Korea to return to the six-party talks that are meant to eventually denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.
On Tuesday, in six hours of meetings, at two dinners and during a stilted 30-minute news conference in which President Hu Jintao did not allow questions, President Obama was confronted, on his first visit, with a fast-rising China more willing to say no to the United States. [*]
On topics like Iran (Mr. Hu did not publicly discuss the possibility of sanctions), China’s currency (he made no nod toward changing its value) and human rights (a joint statement bluntly acknowledged that the two countries “have differences”), China held firm against most American demands.
With China’s micromanagement of Mr. Obama’s appearances in the country, the trip did more to showcase China’s ability to push back against outside pressure than it did to advance the main issues on Mr. Obama’s agenda, [*]analysts said.
“China effectively stage-managed President Obama’s public appearances, got him to make statements endorsing Chinese positions of political importance to them and effectively squelched discussions of contentious issues such as human rights and China’s currency policy,” said Eswar S. Prasad, a China specialist at Cornell University. “In a master stroke, they shifted the public discussion from the global risks posed by Chinese currency policy to the dangers of loose monetary policy and protectionist tendencies in the U.S.”
White House officials maintained they got what they had come for — the beginning of a needed give-and-take with a surging economic giant. With a civilization as ancient as China’s, they argued, it would be counterproductive — and reminiscent of President George W. Bush’s style — for Mr. Obama to confront Beijing with loud chest-beating that might alienate the Chinese. Mr. Obama, the officials insisted, had made his points during private meetings and one-on-one sessions.
“I do not expect, and I can speak authoritatively for the president on this, that we thought the waters would part and everything would change over the course of our almost two-and-a-half-day trip to China,” said Robert Gibbs, the White House spokesman. “We understand there’s a lot of work to do and that we’ll continue to work hard at making more progress.”
Several China experts noted that Mr. Obama was not leaving Beijing empty-handed. The two countries put out a five-point joint statement pledging to work together on a variety of issues. [*] The statement calls for regular exchanges between Mr. Obama and Mr. Hu and asks that each side pay more attention to the strategic concerns of the other. [*]The statement also pledges that they will work as partners on economic issues, Iran and climate change. [*]
But despite a conciliatory tone that began weeks ago when Mr. Obama declined to meet the Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, before visiting China to avoid offending China’s leaders, it remains unclear whether Mr. Obama made progress on the most pressing policy matters on the American agenda in China or elsewhere in Asia.
The president has had to fend off criticism from American conservatives that he appeared to soften the American stance on the positioning of troops on the Japanese island of Okinawa, and for bowing to Japan’s emperor.
At a regional conference in Singapore, Mr. Obama announced a setback on another top foreign policy priority, climate change, acknowledging that comprehensive agreement to fight global warming was no longer within reach this year. [*]
Past American presidents have usually insisted in advance on some concrete achievements from their trips overseas. President Bush received vigorous endorsements of his top foreign policy priority, the global war on terrorism, during his visits to Beijing, and President Bill Clinton guided China toward joining the World Trade Organization after prolonged negotiations. When either of those presidents visited the country, China often made a modest concession on human rights as well.
This time, Mr. Hu declined to follow the lead of President Dmitri A. Medvedev of Russia, who, after months of massaging by the Obama administration, now says that he is open to tougher sanctions against Iran if negotiations fail to curb Iran’s nuclear program. The administration needs China’s support if tougher sanctions are to be approved by the United Nations Security Council. But during the joint appearance in Beijing on Tuesday, Mr. Hu made no mention of sanctions.
Rather, he said, it was “very important” to “appropriately resolve the Iranian nuclear regime through dialogue and negotiations.” And then, as if to drive home that point, Mr. Hu added, “During the talks, I underlined to President Obama that given our differences in national conditions, it is only normal that our two sides may disagree on some issues.”
White House officials acknowledged that they did not get what they wanted from Mr. Hu on Iran but said that Mr. Obama’s method would yield more in the long term. “We’re not looking for them to lead or change course, we’re looking for them to not be obstructionist,” one administration official said.
In a meeting in Beijing with a senior Chinese official on Wednesday morning, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton again pressed China on Iran. She told the official, Dai Bingguo, that even if China had not decided what sanctions on Iran it would accept, “you need to send a signal,” said a senior American official, who spoke on condition of anonymity so he could describe the exchange.
There are many reasons the White House may have heeded China’s clear desire for a visit free of the polemics that often accompany meetings between leaders of the two countries. Mr. Obama’s foreign policy is rooted in recasting the United States as a thoughtful listener to friends and rivals alike. “No we haven’t made China a democracy in three days — maybe if we pounded our chest a lot that would work,” Mr. Gibbs said in an e-mail message on Tuesday night. “But it hasn’t in the last 16 years.”
Kenneth Lieberthal, a Brookings Institution scholar who oversaw China issues in President Clinton’s White House, agreed. “The United States actually has enormous influence on popular thinking in China, but it is primarily by example,” he said. “If you go to the next step and say, ‘You guys ought to be like us,’ you lose the impact of who you are.”
The National Security Council’s spokesman, Michael A. Hammer, added, “What we did come to do is speak bluntly about the issues which are important to us, not in an unnecessarily offensive manner, but rather in the Obama style of showing respect.”
Mr. Obama, even as he projected a softer image, did nudge the Chinese on some delicate issues.
On Tuesday, standing next to Mr. Hu, Mr. Obama brought up Tibet, where Beijing-backed authorities have clamped down on religious freedom. “While we recognize that Tibet is part of the People’s Republic of China, the United States supports the early resumption of dialogue between the Chinese government and representatives of the Dalai Lama to resolve any concerns and differences that the two sides may have,” he said.
Reporting was contributed by Sharon LaFraniere, Edward Wong, Michael Wines and Mark Landler.
Copyright 2009 The New York Times Company

Obama Says Guantánamo Won’t Close by January

2009-11-20T21:12:22Z

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/19/us/19gitmo.html
November 19, 2009
Obama Says Guantánamo Won’t Close by January
By JACK HEALY [Obama white house] [111th congress, 1st session] [decisions surely made at highest NSC levels with heavy justice dept input] [federal judiciary] [Obama and his team know that the Jan dealine will be missed] [use psci355, 455, 469] [*]
President Obama acknowledged for the first time on Wednesday that his administration would miss a self-imposed deadline to close the detention center at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, by mid-January, admitting the difficulties of following through on one of his first pledges as president.
“Guantánamo, we had a specific deadline that was missed,” Mr. Obama said in an interview with NBC News in Beijing during his weeklong trip to Asia. Hours after he spoke, Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. defended the administration’s decision to try five suspected

]]> http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/19/us/19gitmo.html
November 19, 2009
Obama Says Guantánamo Won’t Close by January
By JACK HEALY [Obama white house] [111th congress, 1st session] [decisions surely made at highest NSC levels with heavy justice dept input] [federal judiciary] [Obama and his team know that the Jan dealine will be missed] [use psci355, 455, 469] [*]
President Obama acknowledged for the first time on Wednesday that his administration would miss a self-imposed deadline to close the detention center at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, by mid-January, admitting the difficulties of following through on one of his first pledges as president.
“Guantánamo, we had a specific deadline that was missed,” Mr. Obama said in an interview with NBC News in Beijing during his weeklong trip to Asia. Hours after he spoke, Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. defended the administration’s decision to try five suspected terrorists in New York City — a move closely tied to its efforts to close Guantánamo.
On Capitol Hill, Mr. Holder reiterated that prosecutors would seek the death penalty against the men, and rebuffed criticisms that a civilian trial afforded the defendants too much regard, or would jeopardize national security.
“We need not cower in the face of this enemy,” Mr. Holder told the Senate Judiciary Committee. “Our institutions are strong. Our infrastructure is sturdy. Our resolve is firm, and our people are ready.
Mr. Obama, in the NBC interview, also stood behind the decision to prosecute Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the self-avowed mastermind of the Sept. 11 attacks, saying that any anger at the civilian trial would disappear “when he’s convicted and when the death penalty is applied to him.”
“I have complete confidence in the American people and our legal traditions and the prosecutors,” he said.
On Guantánamo, Mr. Obama said that he now hoped to shut down the detention facility sometime next year, but he did not set a new deadline.
“We are on a path and a process where I would anticipate that Guantánamo will be closed next year,” Mr. Obama said in a separate interview with Fox News. “I’m not going to set an exact date because a lot of this is also going to depend on cooperation from Congress.”
The prospects for fully shutting down Guantánamo have been dimming for months as the administration stumbled over a litany of political and logistical tripwires. Gregory B. Craig, the White House counsel who drafted the order to close the facility, announced last week that he was stepping down. During the presidential campaign last year, Mr. Obama railed against the detention complex on an American military base in Cuba, calling it a symbol used by terrorists to recruit new members. Within days of his inauguration, he ordered Guantánamo closed by January.
But his plans to relocate the prison’s 200 remaining inmates to other countries or to other detention centers in the United States have been stymied by opposition from Democrats and Republicans in Congress, as well as residents who live close to prisons that could house terrorists. [*]
Most recently, the administration said it was considering sending terrorism suspects from Guantánamo to a maximum-security state prison in Thomson, Ill., about 150 miles west of Chicago, though some other prisons are also under consideration.
Last week, the Department of Justice decided that five terrorism suspects — including Mr. Mohammed — would be prosecuted in federal court in New York City, rather than face military tribunals.
Mr. Holder said that the prosecutions in a civilian court was an important milestone toward closing the Guantánamo detention center, even as critics like Rudolph W. Giuliani, New York’s former Republican mayor, accused the administration of making the city a target.
When asked what might happen to any of the four defendants who are acquitted, Mr. Holder said: "Failure is not an option. These are cases that have to be won. I don’t expect that we will have a contrary result."
With that, Senator Charles Grassley, an Iowa Republican, said sarcastically, "It just seemed to me ludicrous, but I’m a farmer, not a lawyer." [he’s neither and it shows most of the time] [he is a professional politician and has been for some time and that sadly means saying whatever polls well] [*]
Mr. Holder insisted the suspects would be convicted, but that in any case, "that doesn’t mean that person would be released into our country."
Helene Cooper contributed reporting from Seoul, South Korea.
Copyright 2009 The New York Times Company

Who promoted Hasan?

2009-11-20T21:11:27Z

http://voices.washingtonpost.com/postpartisan/2009/11/who_promoted_hasan.html
[accessed 11/20/09 10:06 AM]
The Washington Post Blogs
Post Partisan: Quick Takes by the Post's Opinion Writers
Who promoted Hasan?
Who promoted Peress? That was the question posed by Sen. Joseph McCarthy, the indefatigable red-hunter of the 1950s, regarding an obscure army dentist named Irving Peress who was promoted from captain to major despite having refused to answer questions regarding his loyalty. That right-wing rallying cry ought to be revived, only this

]]> http://voices.washingtonpost.com/postpartisan/2009/11/who_promoted_hasan.html
[accessed 11/20/09 10:06 AM]
The Washington Post Blogs
Post Partisan: Quick Takes by the Post's Opinion Writers
Who promoted Hasan?
Who promoted Peress? That was the question posed by Sen. Joseph McCarthy, the indefatigable red-hunter of the 1950s, regarding an obscure army dentist named Irving Peress who was promoted from captain to major despite having refused to answer questions regarding his loyalty. That right-wing rallying cry ought to be revived, only this time to pose a much more serious question: Who the hell promoted Nidal Malik Hasan? [*]
The case of the Army psychiatrist charged with the murder of 13 persons at Fort Hood raises many questions -- about terrorism, of course, and whether the massacre could have been prevented. But it also makes me wonder how Hasan went from captain, which he was in April, to major, which is what he was the day he allegedly went on his homicidal rampage. [agreed] [*] The question is pertinent because while he was a mere captain and stationed at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, he was evaluated as supremely incompetent.
The evaluation, obtained by National Public Radio, shows that Hasan’s superiors had serious concerns about him. He was accused of having a “poor record of attendance,” of inappropriately discussing religion his patients, of being “consistently late,” of not being available even for emergencies, of permitting a “homicidal patient” to escape the emergency room and of simply not showing up for a night shift.
NPR went to private psychiatrists and asked them if they would hire someone with such a record. They all said no -- they’re not crazy, after all. That being the case, this raises the question of how and why Hasan went from captain to major. Was it because of an excess of caution regarding political correctness? Was it because no one cared enough or paid enough attention to stop it? Was it because Hasan filled a slot -- and the poor patients be damned? Whatever the case, Hasan moved up a grade. [probably mostly they need officers and mental-health professionals so badly but some others] [*] The Senate is now investigating what went wrong at Fort Hood. It ought to start with a simple question:
Who promoted Hasan?
By Richard Cohen | November 19, 2009; 10:16 AM ET Categories: Cohen | Tags: Richard Cohen
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'Pakistan has nothing to fear from India'

2009-11-20T21:10:42Z

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/19/AR2009111903666.html
'Pakistan has nothing to fear from India'
By Lally Weymouth Sunday, November 22, 2009 [interview of Post editorial folks with India’s leader, PM Singh] [*]
NEW DELHI -- Wearing white robes and a blue turban, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh appeared relaxed this week as he discussed his upcoming state visit to Washington. Singh, 77, will meet President Obama next week at a time when many Indians fear that Obama will focus less on India than did previous American administrations, particularly as the U.S.-Chinese relationship grows in importance. Singh sat down in his Delhi residence with Newsweek-Washington Post's Lally Weymouth to discuss terrorism, trade and why it is critical that the United States not abandon Afghanistan. Excerpts:
You are President Obama's first official state visitor. What would you like to accomplish in Washington?

]]> http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/19/AR2009111903666.html
'Pakistan has nothing to fear from India'
By Lally Weymouth Sunday, November 22, 2009 [interview of Post editorial folks with India’s leader, PM Singh] [*]
NEW DELHI -- Wearing white robes and a blue turban, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh appeared relaxed this week as he discussed his upcoming state visit to Washington. Singh, 77, will meet President Obama next week at a time when many Indians fear that Obama will focus less on India than did previous American administrations, particularly as the U.S.-Chinese relationship grows in importance. Singh sat down in his Delhi residence with Newsweek-Washington Post's Lally Weymouth to discuss terrorism, trade and why it is critical that the United States not abandon Afghanistan. Excerpts:
You are President Obama's first official state visitor. What would you like to accomplish in Washington?
We are strategic partners. We have good relations. But there is a new administration in America. So it is appropriate that I should renew our partnership.
Will you and the president announce any new initiatives? How might India and the United States cooperate in the future?
We have a landmark agreement with the United States on nuclear cooperation. We would like to operationalize it and ensure that the objectives for the nuclear deal are realized in full. My hope is that we can persuade the U.S. administration to be more liberal when it comes to transferring technologies to us. The restrictions make no sense. India has an impeccable record of not participating in any proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. So that's my number one concern. [the nuclear deal that Bush administration signed with them] [it still needs ratification by senate] [*]
I also think that India and the United States could be partners in refocusing our attention on an equitable, balanced global order.
What does that mean?
We would like to strengthen energy cooperation with the United States -- [in] clean coal technology and in renewable energy resources. Similarly, there is concern for food security. We would like to have a second Green Revolution in our country -- therefore, cooperation in the field of agriculture, in science and technology, in health, and in dealing with pandemics. [*]
How do you see Afghanistan?
I hope the United States and the global community will stay involved in Afghanistan. A victory for the Taliban in Afghanistan would have catastrophic consequences for the world, particularly for South Asia, for Central Asia and for the Middle East. [interesting] [by contrast, Iran certainly doesn’t hope the U.S. stays involved in Iraq] [*]Religious fundamentalism in the 1980s was used to defeat the Soviet Union. If this same group of people that defeated the Soviet Union now defeats the other major power, this would embolden them in a manner which could have catastrophic consequences for the world.
We [in India] of course have more immediate concerns. We are victims of terrorism and the extremist ideologies of the type that the Taliban represent. If this is not checked, this could destabilize our country.
Do you believe there is a close connection between al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban?
There is a close connection. They are chips off the same block. [Singh’s view of Taliban-al Qaeda relationship] [*]
How do you feel about Afghan President Hamid Karzai?
President Karzai's regime is not perfect. There are problems of improving governance. But you cannot transform Afghanistan overnight. It is going to be a long-term affair. Democracy, as the West understands it, may not be introduced in a short period of time in Afghanistan. But the very fact that millions of Afghan children, including millions of girls, are now in school, when none was in school when the Taliban was in power, shows some human freedom. One has to take a balanced view. Now that President Karzai has been reelected, I think the time has come that the global community should rally behind him.
How do you assess the situation in Pakistan?
We are concerned about the rise of terrorism in Pakistan. We have been the victims of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism for a long time. Now if the Taliban and al-Qaeda type of terror, which in the past was located in the FATA [*]area [Federally Administered Tribal Areas] of Pakistan, gets transferred to the mainland of Pakistan, I think it has very serious consequences for our own security. We would not like terrorism to lead to a situation where the civilian government is only a nominal government.
Don't you think that's the situation now?
I'm not saying that's the situation now. But obviously al-Qaeda and the terrorists have a grip over several parts of Pakistan.
Do you think the Pakistanis are trying as hard as they can?
As far as Afghanistan is concerned, I'm not sure whether the United States and Pakistan have the same objectives. Pakistan would like Afghanistan to be under its control. And they would like the United States to get out soon. The U.S. objectives are to get Pakistan to deal with the Taliban in Afghanistan. But I don't see Pakistan wholeheartedly in support of action against the Taliban in Afghanistan. They are of course taking action against the Taliban, but only when it threatens the supremacy of the army. [spot-on analysis] [*]
So does that leave India and the United States able to cooperate against the Taliban?
We have supported the strong presence of the international community in Afghanistan. We have provided substantial resources for the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan, about $1.2 billion. We would like to do more and believe we can do it more effectively than any other aid donor. We are involved in strengthening schools, health care and electricity.
People in the United States don't understand why we are in Afghanistan.
I hope the U.S. public understands where it all started after 9/11. If al-Qaeda had not had a home in Afghanistan, maybe 9/11 would never have taken place. God forbid if al-Qaeda gets another strong foothold in Afghanistan. [I’m not sure that’s quite accurate but mostly the case] [*]
Might there be a civil war in Afghanistan if the United States withdraws?
There is that danger.
Regarding Pakistan, is the most important matter to see the terrorist groups brought under control?
We have been the victims of Pakistan-aided, -abetted and -inspired terrorism for nearly 25 years. We would like the United States to use all its influence with Pakistan to desist from that path. Pakistan has nothing to fear from India. It's a tragedy that Pakistan has come to the point of using terror as an instrument of state policy.
What do you expect to achieve in Washington?
Nuclear cooperation, cooperation in education, closer linkages between the university systems of our two countries, cooperation in health -- working together to devise new vaccines.
What do you expect to achieve during the upcoming Copenhagen summit on climate change and control of carbon emissions?
The developed countries have an obligation to perform with regard to the reduction of emissions. I hope that Copenhagen will reaffirm that. Without the United States giving a lead, I don't see a deal at Copenhagen that can become a reality. [ouch] [*] We recognize our own responsibilities, but we recognize that dealing with climate change is a responsibility of all humanity. We have put in place a national action plan to deal with climate change.
Do you worry about Iran getting a nuclear weapon?
I met recently with the Iranian foreign minister. We did discuss the nuclear question. The message he left with me was that they feel encouraged by the messages they are receiving from the Obama administration. [they sure don’t act that way] [*]
Is your aim to stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon?
Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It must have all the privileges that go with being a member of the NPT, [including] the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It also has all the obligations that go with NPT membership. Therefore, I think nuclear weapons are not an option. [*]
But many observers believe that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program.
I had the pleasure of [meeting] the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency a few weeks ago, and he was not so sure that Iran is definitely working towards a nuclear weapon.
You entered into talks with Gen. Pervez Musharraf when he was head of Pakistan. Are there any steps to be taken now with Pakistan?
We are committed to resolve all the outstanding issues with Pakistan through bilateral negotiations. Our only condition is that Pakistan should not allow its territory to be used for acts of terrorism against India. If Pakistan really honors that commitment, we can go back to negotiations to resolve all outstanding issues between us.
If you look at Mumbai, the Pakistanis apparently were not honoring the agreement.
As far as the perpetrators of the Mumbai massacre are concerned, [Pakistan] has taken some steps but not enough.
Do you worry about another Mumbai?
Every day I receive intelligence reports saying that terrorists based in Pakistan are planning other similar acts. [*] [*]
Do you see China as a threat, a trading partner or both?
China has emerged as a major trading partner with us. But we have problems with China with regard to our boundary dispute, and we both are engaged in discussions of the boundary. I believe there is enough space in the world to accommodate the ambitions of both India and China. [*]
Do you believe that the economic crisis has eroded the U.S. leadership role in Asia?
I hope the United States will recover from last year's disaster. With the entrepreneurial skills of the U.S. business class and the U.S. educational system, I have no doubt that the United States will overcome this temporary setback.
What about India? You seem to have escaped the downturn.
First of all, our banking system is better regulated. [if it’s regulated it’s better regulated] [the US one is regulated in name only] [*] We don't allow our banking system to invest heavily in those types of assets. . . . Our export growth rate has sharply declined. The flow of capital has also been affected. But more recently, capital has started coming back to our country. Before the crisis, our growth rate was at 8.5 percent to 9 percent per year. This year it will be about 6.5 percent. In two years, we should go back to 9 percent growth rates.
What would you like to achieve in the next few years?
A growth rate of about 9 percent per annum and to ensure that this growth is an inclusive growth -- that the benefits of development reach out to all sectors of our population.
Do you feel you've made a difference to your country as prime minister? What will your legacy be?
I hope I've made some difference. That's for posterity to judge. © 2009 The Washington Post Company

Obama the undecider

2009-11-20T21:09:49Z

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/19/AR2009111903435.html
Obama the undecider
By Michael Gerson Friday, November 20, 2009 [oped] [it’s possible he’s nailed it] [it’s also possible more going on than we realize?] [for instance I concluded last week—and discussed it in my foreign policy class—that Obama made the decision and he’s doing Kabuki theater for some good reasons and some expideincy] [*]
In the beginning, the Obama administration directed a spotlight toward its careful, thoughtful decision-making process on Afghanistan. National security meetings were announced, photographed and highlighted in background briefings to the media. President Obama would apply the methods of the academy to the art of war -- the University of Chicago meets West Point -- thus assuring a skittish public that deliberation had preceded decision.

]]> http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/19/AR2009111903435.html
Obama the undecider
By Michael Gerson Friday, November 20, 2009 [oped] [it’s possible he’s nailed it] [it’s also possible more going on than we realize?] [for instance I concluded last week—and discussed it in my foreign policy class—that Obama made the decision and he’s doing Kabuki theater for some good reasons and some expideincy] [*]
In the beginning, the Obama administration directed a spotlight toward its careful, thoughtful decision-making process on Afghanistan. National security meetings were announced, photographed and highlighted in background briefings to the media. President Obama would apply the methods of the academy to the art of war -- the University of Chicago meets West Point -- thus assuring a skittish public that deliberation had preceded decision.
Now the president and Defense Secretary Robert Gates are desperately trying to jerk the spotlight away from a dysfunctional Afghan decision-making process in which chaos has preceded choice, complicating every possible outcome. [it’s a plausible argument] [*]
Gates said he is "appalled by the amount of leaking that has been going on," which would be, if the culprits are discovered, "a career-ender." Obama recently added, "I think I am angrier than Bob Gates about it." They should be appalled and angry at the process they created -- as should the rest of the country.
Sometimes government leaks are self-serving, reflecting the powerful passion of midlevel functionaries to appear in the know. But leaks in this process have been attempts to rig the outcome of a national security decision. [probably; but probably multiple reasons including the usual suspects (self serving, aggrandizement, …)] [*]
This summer, nameless White House officials began leaking their skepticism of plans for troop increases. Then Gen. Stanley McChrystal's assessment, calling for a more troop-intensive counterinsurgency strategy, was leaked. Then a leak of internal government reviews on the poor state of the Afghan military and police forces. Then a leak from "informed sources" that Obama had settled on a troop increase of 34,000. Then the leak that Obama had rejected all the military options on the table and was insisting on refinements. Then the leak of two classified cables from Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, which cautioned against troop increases, leaving McChrystal, according to another nameless source, feeling "stabbed in the back." [leak chronology on AfPak] [*]
The Afghan policy process has resulted in more leaks than Oktoberfest. Leaks are a form of disloyalty -- an attempt to box in the president of the United States, a mini-coup in which unelected officials attempt to substitute their judgment for the president's. Leaks increase tension and anger, then leave the losing side in a debate publicly humiliated and perhaps alienated from the outcome. Depending on that outcome, Obama will be vulnerable to charges of buckling to military pressure or disregarding the advice of his commanders.
Though leaks are bad for the president and the country, they are gifts for journalists and commentators, who often draw their purpose from the failures of others. We have learned that Obama's national security team is both deeply divided and playing for blood. Military-civilian tensions are growing and have become reflected on the ground in Afghanistan. One key to the success of the surge in Iraq was the close cooperation of Gen. David Petraeus, in charge of military operations, and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, who led the civilian efforts. McChrystal and Eikenberry seem to have a different relationship. [that was rather clever of him] [one sentence only poignant with possiblities of the nature of said relationship] [*]
We have also learned that military and civilian timelines are quickly diverging. In his strategy memo sent on Aug. 30, McChrystal warned: "Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) -- while Afghan security capacity matures -- risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible." At that time, I talked to administration officials who were hoping the buildup of troops would begin in earnest before the end of the year. Soon, three months will have passed since McChrystal made his dire assessment -- three months of leaks and recriminations that must give pause to our troops and encouragement to our enemies. While it is important to get a military decision right, it is also possible for the right decision to come too late.
It is not fair that large presidential choices must be made with insufficient time and information, but it is also not unusual. [*]A dysfunctional process on Afghanistan has begun to narrow the range of good outcomes. The time and the options in Afghanistan are limited. "As an analogy," says David Kilcullen, an expert on counterinsurgency strategy, "you have a building on fire, and it's got a bunch of firemen inside. There are not enough firemen to put it out. You have to send in more or you have to leave. It is not appropriate to stand outside pontificating about not taking lightly the responsibility of sending firemen into harm's way. [*] Either put in enough firemen to put the fire out or get out of the house." mgerson@globalengage.org © 2009 The Washington Post Company

Holder's reasonable decision

2009-11-20T21:09:10Z

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/19/AR2009111903470.html
Holder's reasonable decision
By Jim Comey and Jack Goldsmith Friday, November 20, 2009 [oped] [note: Goldsmith was influential in Bush doj] [involved hospital-room visit ad GWU as I recall?] [on AG Holder’s recent decision of trials in Souther Disctrict Court of NY] [use psci 355,455] [*]
Reasonable minds can disagree about Attorney General Eric Holder's decision to prosecute Khalid Sheik Mohammed and four other alleged Sept. 11 perpetrators in a Manhattan federal court. But some prominent criticisms are exaggerated, and others place undue faith in military commissions as an alternative to civilian trials. [absolutely] [it’s because most of the criticisms are political rather than substantive] [there’s no one who’s been more an advocate of defeating global-jihadis hydra that I; and I have no problem with the decision and actually think it’s best on balance] [*]
Mohammed is many things: an enemy combatant in a war against the United States whom

]]> http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/19/AR2009111903470.html
Holder's reasonable decision
By Jim Comey and Jack Goldsmith Friday, November 20, 2009 [oped] [note: Goldsmith was influential in Bush doj] [involved hospital-room visit ad GWU as I recall?] [on AG Holder’s recent decision of trials in Souther Disctrict Court of NY] [use psci 355,455] [*]
Reasonable minds can disagree about Attorney General Eric Holder's decision to prosecute Khalid Sheik Mohammed and four other alleged Sept. 11 perpetrators in a Manhattan federal court. But some prominent criticisms are exaggerated, and others place undue faith in military commissions as an alternative to civilian trials. [absolutely] [it’s because most of the criticisms are political rather than substantive] [there’s no one who’s been more an advocate of defeating global-jihadis hydra that I; and I have no problem with the decision and actually think it’s best on balance] [*]
Mohammed is many things: an enemy combatant in a war against the United States whom the government can detain without trial until the conflict ends; a war criminal subject to trial by military commission under the laws of war; and someone answerable in federal court for violations of the U.S. criminal code. Which system he is placed in for purposes of incapacitation and justice involves complex legal and political trade-offs.
A trial in Manhattan will bring enormous media attention and require unprecedented security. But it is unlikely to make New York a bigger target than it has been since February 1993, when Mohammed's nephew Ramzi Yousef attacked the World Trade Center. If al-Qaeda could carry out another attack in New York, it would -- a fact true a week ago and for a long time. Its inability to do so is a testament to our military, intelligence and law enforcement responses since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. [I agree] [they’ve probably not been lucky either and it required some luck to pull off 9/11] [but it’s really important to note that US efforts have been successful including military and law-enforcement efforts and both needed] [**]
In deciding to use federal court, the attorney general probably considered the record of the military commission system that was established in November 2001. This system secured three convictions in eight years. The only person who had a full commission trial, Osama bin Laden's driver, received five additional months in prison, resulting in a sentence that was shorter than he probably would have received from a federal judge.
One reason commissions have not worked well is that changes in constitutional, international and military laws since they were last used, during World War II, have produced great uncertainty about the commissions' validity. This uncertainty has led to many legal challenges that will continue indefinitely -- hardly an ideal situation for the trial of the century.
By contrast, there is no question about the legitimacy of U.S. federal courts to incapacitate terrorists. Many of Holder's critics appear to have forgotten that the Bush administration used civilian courts to put away dozens of terrorists, including "shoe bomber" Richard Reid; al-Qaeda agent Jose Padilla; "American Taliban" John Walker Lindh; the Lackawanna Six; and Zacarias Moussaoui, [yes, conveniently forgot] [and it’s interesting that one of them is Veep (former) Cheney who knows better but is so eager for vindication of his views, he doesn’t much care] [*] who was prosecuted for the same conspiracy for which Mohammed is likely to be charged. Many of these terrorists are locked in a supermax prison in Colorado, never to be seen again.
In terrorist trials over the past 15 years, federal prosecutors and judges have gained extensive experience protecting intelligence sources and methods, limiting a defendant's ability to raise irrelevant issues and tightly controlling the courtroom. Moussaoui's trial was challenging because his request for access to terrorists held at "black" sites had to be litigated. Difficulties also arose because Moussaoui acted as his own lawyer, and the judge labored to control him. But it is difficult to imagine a military commission of rudimentary fairness that would not allow a defendant a similar right to represent himself and speak out in court.
In either trial forum, defendants will make an issue of how they were treated and attempt to undermine the trial politically. These efforts are likely to have more traction in a military than a civilian court. No matter how scrupulously fair the commissions are, defendants will criticize their relatively loose rules of evidence, their absence of a civilian jury and their restrictions on the ability to examine classified evidence used against them. Some say it is wrong to give Mohammed trial rights ordinarily conferred on Americans, but a benefit of civilian trials over commissions is that they make it harder for defendants to complain about kangaroo courts or victor's justice.
The potential procedural advantages of military commission trials are relatively unimportant with obviously guilty defendants such as Mohammed, but they help explain the attorney general's related decision last week to consign five men accused of attacking the USS Cole to a military commission. Holder indicated that he was doing so in part because the Cole was a military target outside the United States, but that reason does not hold up. The Pentagon was a military target, many aspects of the Sept. 11 attacks were planned abroad, and the Cole attack is already the subject of a federal indictment in New York.
It is more likely that Holder decided to use a commission system still learning to walk because the Cole case is relatively weak and will benefit from the marginal advantages the commission system offers the government. It is also likely that the Justice Department will decide that many other terrorists at Guantanamo Bay will not be tried in civilian or military court but, rather, will be held under a military detention rationale more suitable to the circumstances of their cases.
These decisions have already invited charges of opportunistic forum shopping. The Bush administration, criticized on similar grounds, properly explained that it would use whatever lawful tool worked best, all things considered, to incapacitate a particular terrorist. Holder's decisions appear to reflect a similarly pragmatic approach.
Of course, the attorney general made a different call on Mohammed than did the Bush administration. The wisdom of that difficult judgment will be determined by future events. But Holder's critics do not help their case by understating the criminal justice system's capacities, overstating the military system's virtues and bumper-stickering a reasonable decision.
Jim Comey, a deputy attorney general and U.S. attorney in Manhattan during the Bush administration, is general counsel of Lockheed Martin Corp. Jack Goldsmith, an assistant attorney general during the Bush administration, teaches at Harvard Law School and is on the Hoover Institution's Task Force on National Security and Law. © 2009 The Washington Post Company

Iraq’s Election Law Morass

2009-11-20T21:08:24Z

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/20/opinion/20fri2.html
November 20, 2009
Editorial
Iraq’s Election Law Morass
[editorial] [the stalemate machine in Baghdad] [its recent mess: a deal so the elections (scheduled for Jan 2010) can take place] [*]
Iraqis have quickly learned to play hardball politics. That was evident on Wednesday when one of Iraq’s two vice presidents, Tariq al-Hashimi, who is a Sunni, vetoed an important election law at the last minute. [*]He demanded a change that would allocate more parliamentary seats for Iraqi Sunnis living abroad.
It is unquestionably better for Iraq’s political leaders to wage their battles through legislative maneuvering than in the streets. But their repeated delays in completing the election law (there have been nearly a dozen attempts) threatens their fragile

]]> http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/20/opinion/20fri2.html
November 20, 2009
Editorial
Iraq’s Election Law Morass
[editorial] [the stalemate machine in Baghdad] [its recent mess: a deal so the elections (scheduled for Jan 2010) can take place] [*]
Iraqis have quickly learned to play hardball politics. That was evident on Wednesday when one of Iraq’s two vice presidents, Tariq al-Hashimi, who is a Sunni, vetoed an important election law at the last minute. [*]He demanded a change that would allocate more parliamentary seats for Iraqi Sunnis living abroad.
It is unquestionably better for Iraq’s political leaders to wage their battles through legislative maneuvering than in the streets. But their repeated delays in completing the election law (there have been nearly a dozen attempts) threatens their fragile constitutional system as well as the American military withdrawal. [*] [they too have to live by SOFA?] [if not, it will have to be renegotiated and suddenly the US would have new influence?] [*] And it could provoke new violence. The law must be finalized as soon as possible.
The Constitution requires the election by the end of January. Election officials had said that the law needed to be done by Oct. 15 to allow enough time to prepare for the voting. Even though Iraq’s Parliament overshot that deadline when it approved compromise legislation, the election was expected to take place between Jan. 18 and Jan. 23. [*]
But the Presidency Council (composed of the president, a Kurd, and two vice presidents, a Sunni and a Shiite) has the final say. And Mr. Hashimi chose to exercise his veto power and put in doubt Iraq’s second national election, a critical test of whether democracy can endure as the United States withdraws its troops.
It was a new reminder that while violence in Iraq has significantly declined over the last couple of years, underlying ethnic tensions remain raw and unresolved. [*]
Sunnis, who ruled Iraq under Saddam Hussein, have felt marginalized since he was deposed in 2003, and two groups that suffered under Saddam — Kurds and Shiites, which are the majority — became politically dominant. So it was not surprising, [I wonder if it’s an effect from the “surge’s” elevation of Sunni perceptions of Sunni power, … when reality is that Shi’a are majority and Sunni never will run the place again?] [*]perhaps, that Mr. Hashimi would try to enhance the voting power of his ethnic bloc. The problem is that Kurds are also demanding a larger share of parliamentary seats and the hard-fought compromise law is fast unraveling.
American officials were instrumental in the last compromise and need to put the same kind of effort into resolving this impasse. The military withdrawal must stay on track, and Iraqis must learn how to forge reliable compromises. Endless battles like this one over the election law can cripple the democratic system they are trying to build and harm their own interests.
Copyright 2009 The New York Times Company

Why We Should Put Jihad on Trial

2009-11-20T21:07:39Z

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/18/opinion/18simon.html
November 18, 2009
Op-Ed Contributor
Why We Should Put Jihad on Trial
By STEVEN SIMON [oped] [1 of 2 authors of the excellent book, Age of Sacred Terror] [on the recent AG Holder announcment of federal courts for gitmo 5] [use psci469; info on internal ideological battle below] [*]
THE Justice Department’s decision to try Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the self-proclaimed mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, in a federal court in New York City has elicited several criticisms. Most are pointless, but one — the idea that it will give a terrorist a platform from which he could stir up support in the Muslim world for his radical views — is well taken. [*]
First, let’s dispose of the straw men. John Boehner, the Republican leader in the House, accused the Obama administration of “treating terrorism as a law enforcement issue” — as

]]> http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/18/opinion/18simon.html
November 18, 2009
Op-Ed Contributor
Why We Should Put Jihad on Trial
By STEVEN SIMON [oped] [1 of 2 authors of the excellent book, Age of Sacred Terror] [on the recent AG Holder announcment of federal courts for gitmo 5] [use psci469; info on internal ideological battle below] [*]
THE Justice Department’s decision to try Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the self-proclaimed mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, in a federal court in New York City has elicited several criticisms. Most are pointless, but one — the idea that it will give a terrorist a platform from which he could stir up support in the Muslim world for his radical views — is well taken. [*]
First, let’s dispose of the straw men. John Boehner, the Republican leader in the House, accused the Obama administration of “treating terrorism as a law enforcement issue” — as though “law enforcement” is an epithet. In truth, the White House’s counterterrorism team is composed largely of the same professionals who battled terrorists under President George W. Bush. [*] They are generally in sync with the White House’s insistence on a strategy that uses law enforcement where appropriate and military force in places, like Afghanistan, where conspirators can’t be arrested by federal agents driving Fords.
Others complain that Mr. Mohammed might take advantage of quirks of the criminal justice system and go free. That’s highly unlikely. First, he has already confessed to the crime; and, given the zero acquittal rate for terrorists in New York previously, any anxiety about a “not guilty” verdict seems unwarranted.
John Yoo, a former Bush administration lawyer, argues that the trial would be an “intelligence bonanza” for our enemies. [why would anybody listen to Yoo?] [*] Also unlikely. Our prosecutors are certain that there is enough unclassified evidence to make their case. Moreover, the most prized intelligence is recent, specific and actionable. Al Qaeda today is most concerned with discovering when and where the next drone missile attack will take place in Pakistan, information not likely to be disclosed during a trial about a conspiracy hatched more than a decade ago.
Which brings us to the idea that allowing Mr. Mohammed to take the stand will give him a soapbox. The truth is, if the trial provides a propaganda platform for anybody, it will be for our side.
First, federal courts do not permit TV cameras in the courtroom, so the opportunity for “real time” jihadist propagandizing won’t exist. And while defendants and their lawyers can question witnesses, they cannot make speeches; judges are kings in this domain and can quash irrelevant oratory. Some point out that in earlier terrorism trials, like those of the plotters of the 1993 World Trade Center attack, the defendants did ramble at length. [*] True, but does anyone who fears a circus now remember a single word from those earlier trials?
The real propaganda event is likely to unfold very differently. Instead of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed making his case, we will see the full measure of the horror of 9/11 outlined to the world in a way that only methodical trials can accomplish. Historically, the public exposure of state-sponsored mass murder or terrorism through a transparent judicial process has strengthened the forces of good and undercut the extremists. [*]The Nuremberg trials were a classic case. And nothing more effectively alerted the world to the danger of genocide than Israel’s prosecution in 1961 of Adolf Eichmann, the bureaucrat who engineered the Holocaust.
In the case of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the alternatives — indefinite incarceration without trial, or a military tribunal closed to the public followed by execution — are far more likely to inspire militant recruits. And highlighting the transparency in our judicial process would strengthen America’s reputation just as cracks are beginning to appear in the jihadist base. A growing number of radical Muslim clerics and theoreticians have reversed course in recent years.
For example, three of Saudi Arabia’s most influential radical clerics — Nasir bin Hamad al-Fahd, Ali al-Khudair and Ahmed al-Khalidi (once described by Osama bin Laden as “our most prominent supporter”) — have disowned Mr. bin Laden. Another, Salman al-Awda, has excoriated him, asking, “How many innocents have you killed?” [this media—mostly internet—ideological battle has gone on for some time] [but in Aug-Sept of 2008, a pretty incredible debate began on internet about al Qaeda and OBL] [**]
Abu Basir al-Tartusi, an influential Jordan-born cleric living in London, now uses the Islamic concept of “covenant” between Muslims and their hosts to condemn jihadist bombings in Britain. In Qatar, the high-profile televangelist Yusuf al-Qaradhawi has advanced a “jurisprudence of jihad” that forbids the killing of most civilians. And from his prison cell in Egypt, Sayyed Imam al-Sharif — the founder of the Egyptian insurgent group that produced Osama bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri — has declared that the jihad against the West must be abandoned. [I was awar of al Sharif’s critique] [*]
To be sure, some of these men’s arguments don’t go far enough to please Western ears. But they are shaping opinion. Polling since 2001 has shown that in most Muslim-majority countries, tolerance for terrorism and support for Al Qaeda is gradually eroding. It is strongly in our interest to reinforce these trends by underscoring the terrorists’ killings of civilians and our own commitment to the rule of law. [but jihadis are actually fragmenting with power diffusing out toward smaller, unaffiliated orgs—they will be difficult to track; see Zarkari’s special on Mumbain aired first on November 19, 2009] [*]
An open trial will also provide a catalyst for reflection among Americans on both 9/11 and its aftermath. The years before the attacks have been thoroughly hashed out through the report of the 9/11 commission and by memoirs and histories. The eight years since, a time of unremitting warfare, has had no similar opportunity for taking stock. Regrettably, no trial can provide closure for the traumas of that day. But a judgment in New York, where the greatest suffering was inflicted, will remind us both of the narrow viciousness of the terrorists’ cause and of the enduring strength of our own values. [thank you] [the US system is incredibly resilient and will prosper even while these trials occur] [*]
Steven Simon is a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the co-author of “The Age of Sacred Terror” and “The Next Attack.”
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