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December 31, 2007

Alleged Taliban Member Detained in Guantanamo Bay Dies of Cancer

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/30/AR2007123002423.html
Alleged Taliban Member Detained in Guantanamo Bay Dies of Cancer
Associated Press
Monday, December 31, 2007; A02 [Guantanamo] [gitmo] [long-time prisoner died in captivity] [unremarkable—cancer] [********]
SAN JUAN, Puerto Rico, Dec. 30 -- An Afghan detainee and alleged member of the Taliban died in custody Sunday after an illness at the U.S. military prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, officials said.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/30/AR2007123002423.html
Alleged Taliban Member Detained in Guantanamo Bay Dies of Cancer
Associated Press
Monday, December 31, 2007; A02 [Guantanamo] [gitmo] [long-time prisoner died in captivity] [unremarkable—cancer] [********]
SAN JUAN, Puerto Rico, Dec. 30 -- An Afghan detainee and alleged member of the Taliban died in custody Sunday after an illness at the U.S. military prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, officials said.
The detainee, identified as Abdul Razzak, 68, had been undergoing chemotherapy treatments since October, the military's Southern Command said in a statement from its Miami headquarters. He was diagnosed with colorectal cancer after complaining of abdominal pain in September.
Razzak was accused of being a Taliban driver and commander of a Taliban cell in Afghanistan. He arrived at Guantanamo Bay in January 2003 [****] following his capture that same month, a military spokesman said.
© 2007 The Washington Post Company

Iraqis Authorize Big Jump in Forces

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/30/AR2007123001922.html
Iraqis Authorize Big Jump in Forces
By Walter Pincus
Monday, December 31, 2007; A13 [bush white house] [-iraq war planning team] [sometimes includes NSC principals and deputies but on a daily basis run by bureaucrats mostly] [here it appears as if some interaction between the levels has produced some SOPs] [dictating how –Iraq will build its future military-defense capabilities] [*******]
Buried in the latest Defense Department quarterly report on Iraq is the disclosure that the Baghdad government is now responsible for setting the size of its security forces, and that it has authorized a level of 550,000 military and police forces -- an increase of more than 40 percent over the level that the U.S.-led coalition reported just three months ago.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/30/AR2007123001922.html
Iraqis Authorize Big Jump in Forces
By Walter Pincus
Monday, December 31, 2007; A13 [bush white house] [-iraq war planning team] [sometimes includes NSC principals and deputies but on a daily basis run by bureaucrats mostly] [here it appears as if some interaction between the levels has produced some SOPs] [dictating how –Iraq will build its future military-defense capabilities] [*******]
Buried in the latest Defense Department quarterly report on Iraq is the disclosure that the Baghdad government is now responsible for setting the size of its security forces, and that it has authorized a level of 550,000 military and police forces -- an increase of more than 40 percent over the level that the U.S.-led coalition reported just three months ago.
"While previous reports have listed numbers authorized by the Coalition and provided estimates of numbers on the payroll, the GoI [Government of Iraq] is now responsible for determining requirements and counting personnel," the Pentagon reported this month. "Therefore, reporting will now reflect GoI statistics."
The new numbers show a jump of more than 150,000 from three months ago, when the coalition put the previously authorized number of military and police at 389,000. According to the Pentagon report, that jump under the Iraqi statistics mainly represents police who "have never been trained, as rapid hiring over the past two years outstripped academy training capacity." [******]
Eight Iraqi provinces have requested more than 45,000 new police slots; the Ministry of Interior has approved hiring 12,000, with orders pending for the rest. But, as the Pentagon report notes, "police force expansions continue on an un-programmed basis" and "increases in provincial police authorizations occur in an ad-hoc fashion."
The Pentagon noted that the Interior Ministry, which is in charge of the police force, not only has recruiting and hiring problems but also does not know "how many of the approximately 376,346 employees on the payroll are regularly reporting for duty."
Unlike the coalition, the Iraqi defense and interior ministries use "the number of authorized and assigned personnel" rather than the number trained as a measure of development of their security forces, the Pentagon reported. At the same time, the Pentagon warned that the two Iraqi ministries "do not accurately track which of those personnel who have been trained as part of U.S.-funded programs are still on the force and which are no longer on the force as a result of being killed in action or leaving for other reasons."
For example, the Pentagon reports that the annual attrition rate for the approximately 255,000-person Iraqi Police Service is running at about 17 percent. The Iraqi army, with an authorized ground force of about 186,000, also had an attrition rate of 17 percent, "in part due to a casualty rate two to three times higher than that of Coalition forces," [***] according to the Pentagon report. But it notes that on average about 2,000 soldiers each week go absent without official leave, and that this year about 21,000 were dropped from the rolls for desertion or for going AWOL.
In the Ministry of Interior, "corruption and sectarian behavior continue to be evident," the Pentagon concludes. However, internal investigations are "increasingly aggressive . . . to uncover perpetrators and reduce their impact." Thirty brigadier generals have been arrested, fired or forced into retirement; "several thousand personnel fired, 700 of whom were fired based on criminal records information"; and 195 police "fired for militia activity and involvement in corruption."
As a result of the firings, the report noted, the Interior Ministry's head of internal affairs and his family received death threats.
The Pentagon expects the security forces to continue growing under the planning of the central government in Baghdad, reaching "between 601,000 and 646,000 by 2010." [****] Police forces would reach near 350,000 and the military would expand to about 280,000, with 260,000 of those in the army. At their peak, Saddam Hussein's military and security forces were estimated to have totaled about 550,000.
© 2007 The Washington Post Company

U.S. Urges North Korea to Fulfill Deal

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/31/world/asia/31korea.html
December 31, 2007
U.S. Urges North Korea to Fulfill Deal
By REUTERS [bush white house] [state department] [bureaucrat] [state’s view of the DPRK’s recent announcement that it was consciously slowing the process] [Kim Jong Il claimed the West had not delivered on fuel oil and other things] [this puts the state department in the bind I’ve written about so often in these pages] [the traditionalist internationalists in the administration have staked a lot on success with DPRK despite the history of DPRK sabotaging such processes] [neoconservative would like few things better than to see DPRK create a major cockup] [they could then say “we told you so”] [*******]
WASHINGTON (Reuters) — North Korea has not met its commitment to account fully for its nuclear activities by the end of 2007 under a disarmament agreement, the United States said Sunday, urging North Korea to comply with its obligations.

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/31/world/asia/31korea.html
December 31, 2007
U.S. Urges North Korea to Fulfill Deal
By REUTERS [bush white house] [state department] [bureaucrat] [state’s view of the DPRK’s recent announcement that it was consciously slowing the process] [Kim Jong Il claimed the West had not delivered on fuel oil and other things] [this puts the state department in the bind I’ve written about so often in these pages] [the traditionalist internationalists in the administration have staked a lot on success with DPRK despite the history of DPRK sabotaging such processes] [neoconservative would like few things better than to see DPRK create a major cockup] [they could then say “we told you so”] [*******]
WASHINGTON (Reuters) — North Korea has not met its commitment to account fully for its nuclear activities by the end of 2007 under a disarmament agreement, the United States said Sunday, urging North Korea to comply with its obligations.
North Korea, which tested a nuclear device in 2006, is facing a deadline at 11 a.m., Eastern time, on Dec. 31 to disclose details of its nuclear program under a disarmament-for-aid deal it reached with the United States, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea.
“It is unfortunate that North Korea has not yet met its commitments by providing a complete and correct declaration of its nuclear programs and slowing down the process of disablement,” [******] a State Department spokesman, Tom Casey, said in a statement.
“We urge North Korea to deliver a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear weapons programs and nuclear weapons and proliferation activities and complete the agreed disablement.”
American and South Korean officials have called on North Korea to say how much plutonium it has produced — about 110 pounds by the United States’ estimates — and respond to American suspicions about a secret program to enrich uranium for weapons.
Copyright 2007 The New York Times Company

U.S. Experts Criticize Bhutto Post-Mortem

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/31/world/asia/31examiners.html
December 31, 2007
U.S. Experts Criticize Bhutto Post-Mortem
By LAWRENCE K. ALTMAN
Leading American experts in forensic pathology this weekend deplored the failure of Pakistani officials to order an autopsy of Benazir Bhutto, saying that the standard medical procedure was a crucial part of any credible investigation of a murder.

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/31/world/asia/31examiners.html
December 31, 2007
U.S. Experts Criticize Bhutto Post-Mortem
By LAWRENCE K. ALTMAN
Leading American experts in forensic pathology this weekend deplored the failure of Pakistani officials to order an autopsy of Benazir Bhutto, saying that the standard medical procedure was a crucial part of any credible investigation of a murder.
Exhuming the body of Ms. Bhutto, 54, a former prime minister who was killed Thursday at a political rally, could still be extremely useful in determining more precisely whether she was shot, hit by shrapnel from a suicide bomb or, less likely, died from striking her head against an object in the vehicle in which she was riding, the experts said in interviews.
A reporter for The New York Times read the experts the entire medical report on Ms. Bhutto.
Proper examination of the autopsy material, the clothing Ms. Bhutto wore when she was killed and the debris in the area surrounding the explosion could also help determine which extremist group made a bomb or fired a bullet, if either caused her death.
Ms. Bhutto’s case recalls that of President John F. Kennedy, who was slain in 1963. Controversy still swirls around the assassination, in part because of a flawed autopsy.
Not performing an autopsy of Ms. Bhutto “was a severe mistake, especially in the light of past problems with the murders of national leaders,” because it will fuel speculation, said Dr. Michael M. Baden, who is a top forensic official for the New York State Police as well as a former New York City chief medical examiner.
Seven doctors, but no forensic pathologist, signed Ms. Bhutto’s medical report. None were “trained to pick up the finer points of gunshot wounds” and other causes of criminal deaths, Dr. Baden said. For example, her doctors said they did not feel a bullet or foreign body, but did not probe for evidence of one.
“With Kennedy, the treating doctors were wrong about the entrance and exit wounds” of the bullet-damaged skull, said Dr. Baden, who was chairman of the forensic pathology panel of the House of Representatives select committees on the assassinations of Kennedy and the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.
Dr. Baden said he suspected that Ms. Bhutto died from a bullet that left two or three tiny fragments seen on X-rays before it exited the skull through a wound that the Pakistani doctors did not notice in part because they apparently did not shave the bloodied thick scalp hair.
Dr. Werner U. Spitz, former chief medical examiner in Detroit, said he could not understand why the government did not try to quench “the thirst of the Pakistani people to know the facts, because they are all angry, and if you confronted them with the facts, maybe the anger” would disappear.
Dr. Spitz said he suspected that Ms. Bhutto died after being hit by a bullet fired from a high-powered rifle.
Dr. Vincent J. DiMaio, a former chief medical examiner in San Antonio, who also deplored the lack of an autopsy in Ms. Bhutto’s case, said he suspected that a fragment that was propelled against her head was a more likely explanation for her death than a bullet wound.
Copyright 2007 The New York Times Company

What Bhutto Was Worried About

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/30/AR2007123002237.html
What Bhutto Was Worried About
By Robert D. Novak
Monday, December 31, 2007; A15 [oped] [columnist] [the prince of darkness on what Bhutto feared and possible American complicity] [**********]
The assassination of Benazir Bhutto followed two months of urgent pleas to the State Department by her representatives for better protection. The U.S. reaction was that she was worried over nothing, expressing assurance that Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf would not let anything happen to her.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/30/AR2007123002237.html
What Bhutto Was Worried About
By Robert D. Novak
Monday, December 31, 2007; A15 [oped] [columnist] [the prince of darkness on what Bhutto feared and possible American complicity] [**********]
The assassination of Benazir Bhutto followed two months of urgent pleas to the State Department by her representatives for better protection. The U.S. reaction was that she was worried over nothing, expressing assurance that Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf would not let anything happen to her.
That attitude led a Bhutto agent to inform a high-ranking State Department official that her camp no longer viewed the backstage U.S. effort to broker a power-sharing agreement between Musharraf and the former prime minister as a good-faith effort toward democracy. [*******]It was, according to the written complaint, an attempt to preserve the politically endangered Musharraf as George W. Bush's man in Islamabad.
President Bush confirmed that judgment with his statement Thursday, within hours of learning that Bhutto was dead, when he urged that the elections scheduled for Jan. 8 be held in furtherance of Pakistani "democracy." That may be Musharraf's position, but it definitely is not the position of his critics. They believed the election would be a sham with Bhutto dead and with Saudi-backed former prime minister Nawaz Sharif boycotting the balloting, though Sharif's party reversed course yesterday. [************]
The Bush administration decided months ago to broker a power-sharing arrangement, with the deeply unpopular Musharraf retiring from the army but remaining as president and the popular Bhutto taking a third try as prime minister (after twice being ousted by the military). That decision was based on Pakistan's strategic importance as a sanctuary for al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters. Bush was in a quandary. Bhutto was much tougher than Musharraf on Islamist extremists, but Bush had invested heavily in the general. [he’s got that right] [the bush administration has had a Musharraf policy not a Pakistan policy] [and they are still to focused on elections as the single exemplar of democracy and pluralism] [*********]
When I last saw Bhutto, over coffee in August at Manhattan's Pierre Hotel, she was deeply concerned about U.S. ambivalence but asked me not to write about it. She had not heard from Musharraf for three weeks after their secret July meeting in Abu Dhabi. She feared the Pakistani military strongman was not being prodded from Washington.
Next came Musharraf's state of emergency and purge of Pakistan's Supreme Court to guarantee legality of his questionable election as president. According to Bhutto's advisers, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice asked Bhutto in a telephone conversation to go along with that process in return for concessions from Musharraf. Bhutto agreed, but she got nothing in return.
The unsuccessful Oct. 18 attempt on Bhutto's life followed the regime's rejection of her requested security protection when she returned from eight years in exile. The Pakistani government vetoed FBI assistance in investigating the attack. On Oct. 26, Bhutto sent an e-mail to Mark Siegel, her friend and Washington spokesman, to be made public only in the event of her death.
"I would hold Musharraf responsible," Bhutto said in the message. "I have been made to feel insecure by his minions." She listed obstruction to her "taking private cars or using tinted windows," using jammers against roadside bombs and being surrounded with police cars. "Without him [Musharraf]," she said, those requests could not have been blocked.
In early December, a former Pakistani government official supporting Bhutto visited a senior U.S. government official to renew Bhutto's security requests. He got a brushoff, a mind-set reflected Dec. 6 at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing. [********]
Richard Boucher, assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian affairs, was asked to respond to fears by nonpartisan American observers of a rigged election. His reply: "I do think they can have a good election. They can have a credible election. They can have a transparent and a fair election. It's not going to be a perfect election." Boucher's words echoed through corridors of power in Islamabad. The Americans' not demanding perfection signaled that they would settle for less. Without Benazir Bhutto around, it is apt to be a lot less. [*************************]
A more sinister fallout of a free hand from Washington for Pakistan might be Bhutto's murder. Neither her shooting on Thursday nor the attempt on her life Oct. 18 bore the trademarks of al-Qaeda. [others have said the opposite] [I’m not certain yet] [*****]After the carnage, government trucks used streams of water to clean up the blood and, in the process, destroyed forensic evidence. If not too late, would an offer and acceptance of investigation by the FBI be in order?
¿ 2007 Creators Syndicate Inc.
© 2007 The Washington Post Company

George Smiley's War

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/30/AR2007123002236.html
George Smiley's War
By Donald Gregg
Monday, December 31, 2007; A15 [oped] [intelligence community] [comparisons of the Cold War versus post-9/11 eras] [Donald Gregg is an old Cold Warrior but from the traditionalist camp of GOP: realist internationalists] [*********] [use nsc?] [use psci 455?]
Many years ago I was given the job of making the final payment to a foreign diplomat who had worked as a recruited agent for the CIA. With the man's retirement, his covert relationship with the agency was ending. The old agent was in an expansive mood when we met, and he told me how much he valued his work for the CIA, not just because it had paid for his children's educations. The information he had passed along about his country and resulting U.S. actions "had stopped us from doing all kinds of stupid things," he said.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/30/AR2007123002236.html
George Smiley's War
By Donald Gregg
Monday, December 31, 2007; A15 [oped] [intelligence community] [comparisons of the Cold War versus post-9/11 eras] [Donald Gregg is an old Cold Warrior but from the traditionalist camp of GOP: realist internationalists] [*********] [use nsc?] [use psci 455?]
Many years ago I was given the job of making the final payment to a foreign diplomat who had worked as a recruited agent for the CIA. With the man's retirement, his covert relationship with the agency was ending. The old agent was in an expansive mood when we met, and he told me how much he valued his work for the CIA, not just because it had paid for his children's educations. The information he had passed along about his country and resulting U.S. actions "had stopped us from doing all kinds of stupid things," he said.
Today, such a conversation would be unlikely for many reasons, chief among them the current reputations of the CIA and of the United States itself. Our bungling of intelligence assessments before the invasion of Iraq and our mismanagement of the occupation; our continued unwillingness to talk to those with whom we disagree; and other missteps, including the mishandling and destruction of detainee interrogation tapes, have shrouded the White House, the Pentagon and CIA headquarters in an aura of incompetence. [too true] [**********]
In the name of the "war on terror," we have abandoned the moral high ground on issues such as prisoner detention, torture and rendition. The Bush administration has become so obsessed by the Sept. 11 attacks that, as former deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage puts it, we are exporting fear, not hope. [*********]
The targets and primary requirements of intelligence agencies change with time. Today's targets are tougher and more dangerous than anything I had to deal with. I worked primarily against the Soviets and the Chinese, and violence was rare. Today's case officers put their lives on the line as they pursue al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. The draconian positions taken by the Bush administration make case officers' lives harder, not easier. The nightmarish images from Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo are bitter obstacles to the development of dialogue with potential recruits and make the threat of capture by Muslim fanatics all the more horrendous. [yes, I too worry abouth this] [on other hand, many of the worst jihadis surely would and in fact have treated prisoners unconscionably] [that doesn’t make it okay for the US to and I regret we have] [and in fact, it may cause Islamists who might not otherwise use such means more prone to] [distinction between jihadis and Islamists] [*************]
Others who have worked in and studied the intelligence world have suggested taking steps to reinvigorate our intelligence and security community. Earlier this year, Richard Dearlove, the retired director of Britain's MI6 intelligence service, said that at the CIA "there are already solid foundations on which to rebuild" but that this will be a 10-year process. [comes off as pretty perspecacious sort in Tenet’s memoirs] [****] There are no quick fixes, he warned. Tim Weiner, author of the excellent CIA history "Legacy of Ashes," spoke in a television interview of the critical need for talented young people, with linguistic skills and a sense of history, to be willing to contribute years of anonymous service to their country.
Fortunately, such people exist. I frequently talk on college campuses and always refer positively to my 31 years with the CIA. Almost inevitably, a student waits after my talk to quietly express interest in becoming an intelligence officer. I encourage all such young people to learn a foreign language, read history and get some overseas experience.
Within the CIA itself, positive steps are already being taken. The current director has quietly brought back into the service some highly experienced, senior people forced out by his predecessor, Porter Goss. And George Tenet's unfortunate "slam-dunk" remark about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction should not obscure his solid, morale-restoring achievements, particularly in Afghanistan, [I mostly agree] [*****] during his long tenure as CIA director.
The CIA has had many ups and downs during its history. The late Meg Greenfield, the former editorial page editor of The Post, wrote a column in Newsweek, "The CIA Without Romance," in 1975 in which she dismissed former director Allen Dulles (as does Weiner in his book) by saying that "in Dulles the potential for disaster is everywhere apparent." She referred to Bill Colby, then the director, as "presiding over one of the great organizational wrecks of our time, a vast secret intelligence agency that has endured a veritable tornado of blown cover, and which is trying to get in line with a sudden demand for public accountability." (Sound familiar?)
In the end, as Greenfield voiced hope for the CIA's revival, she chose John le Carr¿'s fictional hero, George Smiley, as embodying the key virtues of intelligence work. She wrote: "George Smiley has it all, and has it all just right: a fanatical commitment to the inspection of reality, a corollary distaste for daydream and drama, a willingness to make moral distinctions and an understanding of what the practical limits are." Le Carr¿ was a British intelligence officer who served in Germany in the early days of the Cold War. He knew what he was writing about.
As we move into a new year and further into this tumultuous new century, we will need attributes such as Smiley's to best assess foreign threats. When we at last accurately perceive the nature of terrorist challenges, we will recognize that effectively dealing with them is largely a job for intelligence officers and paramilitary specialists. [*****] Such people, skillfully employing the scalpels of deep insight and, if necessary, excision, are far better guardians of our national security and our global reputation than those who indiscriminately wield the broadswords of threat, force, torture and death. [*****]
The writer was a career Central Intelligence Agency officer from 1951 to 1982, after which he served as national security adviser to Vice President George H.W. Bush, U.S. ambassador to South Korea and chairman of the Korea Society.
© 2007 The Washington Post Company

Make-or-Break Time in Iraq?

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/30/AR2007123002238.html
Make-or-Break Time in Iraq?
What the U.S. Decides About Post-Surge Troop Levels Could Prove Decisive
By Jackson Diehl
Monday, December 31, 2007; A15 [oped] [columnist] [-ir] [belaboring the obvious] [******]
For five years Washington-based officials and pundits have repeatedly made the mistake of predicting that the next six or 12 months in Iraq would be decisive. Under the hardheaded leadership of Gen. David H. Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker such talk has been banned: "Nobody says anything about turning a corner, seeing lights at the end of tunnels, any of those phrases," [****] Petraeus recently declared. [wise] [****] [thank god somebody remembers Viet Nam]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/30/AR2007123002238.html
Make-or-Break Time in Iraq?
What the U.S. Decides About Post-Surge Troop Levels Could Prove Decisive
By Jackson Diehl
Monday, December 31, 2007; A15 [oped] [columnist] [-ir] [belaboring the obvious] [******]
For five years Washington-based officials and pundits have repeatedly made the mistake of predicting that the next six or 12 months in Iraq would be decisive. Under the hardheaded leadership of Gen. David H. Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker such talk has been banned: "Nobody says anything about turning a corner, seeing lights at the end of tunnels, any of those phrases," [****] Petraeus recently declared. [wise] [****] [thank god somebody remembers Viet Nam]
Yet, for once, saying that the next six to 12 months will win or lose the war just might be right.
That's not because Iraqis have suddenly developed the capacity to meet the unrealistic timelines drawn up in Washington ever since 2003 -- when the Pentagon planned to reduce U.S. troops to a skeleton force of 30,000 within six months of the capture of Baghdad. On the contrary, Petraeus and Crocker have spent the past year attempting to drive home the point that the U.S. goal of a stable, democratizing Iraq, if it can be achieved at all, will require an American commitment well beyond any of the timetables discussed in Washington -- despite the remarkable success of this year's military surge. [********]
So the next six to 12 months are not crucial because of what will happen in Iraq -- where, at best, violence will continue to decline incrementally, while Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds make painful and partial progress toward political settlements. The test will come in the United States -- where first the Pentagon and the White House, and then the country, will decide whether to invest enough resources in Iraq to keep the hope of eventual success alive.
The number of American soldiers in Iraq started coming down last month. By July it will have dropped from the peak of 180,000 it reached briefly in November to 130,000, or 15 brigades, the force level before the surge. [****] The Pentagon has until March to judge how Iraqis react to the initial withdrawals -- whether violence in volatile places such as Anbar province remains low or escalates again as U.S. troops depart. Then another decision will be made, on whether to reduce the force by five more brigades, to a total of about 100,000 troops, by the end of 2008.
This decision ought to be based entirely on whether Iraq's progress can continue with an American force 40 percent smaller than it was at the surge's peak. But external politics is already intruding: Gen. George Casey, the architect of the failed U.S. military strategy in Iraq pre-Petraeus, is already pushing for the full reduction, on the grounds that the Army needs to reduce its exposure in Iraq. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, whose strategic preoccupation has been arriving at a force level in Iraq that could win bipartisan acceptance in Washington, has said publicly that he'd like to hit the 100,000 target. [******]
And what if 100,000 troops won't be enough to maintain the fragile lull in the fighting between Sunnis and Shiites or the return of something like normal life in Baghdad? In all likelihood, President Bush will have to choose between the competing priorities of Petraeus and the Pentagon.
Let's say Bush backs Petraeus. Then a major subject of the fall presidential campaign will be whether a large U.S. combat force should continue to support the Iraqi government after Bush leaves office. So far, all of the major Republican candidates are saying they are committed to success in Iraq -- which presumably means that, as long as the strategy seems to be working, they will continue to deploy the troops Petraeus and his successors deem necessary.
The three leading Democrats, [*****] in contrast, continue to describe Iraq as an irremediable failure, despite the obvious comeback of the past year. While they have refused to commit to removing all U.S. forces from Iraq by 2013, they have said that they would quickly withdraw all combat forces. Barring near-miraculous Iraqi progress in the next 13 months, that would almost certainly invite the eruption of the civil war that almost all serious observers -- from Crocker to the CIA -- have warned would be the result of a quick withdrawal. [first, to characterize only those who agree with you as “serious observers” is a cheap, transparent device] [second, despite what any of the Dems say, if one becomes president (s)he unlikely to withdrawal precipitously] [let’s us remember how Viet Nam boxed in president after president including Dems and Repubs] [*********]
In a telephone conversation with Washington journalists last week, Crocker said that Iraqis he's spoken with aren't terribly worried so far by the reduction of American forces: "I have not detected a great deal of nervousness that we are simply going to pull the plug and allow this to spiral back downward," he said. "At the most fundamental level there is a view [in Iraq] that things are moving in the right direction; that security is improving; that the surge has worked; that Iraqi forces are more numerous and more capable; and that therefore why on earth would we abandon a winning proposition?" [ambassador Crocker] [********]
Why, indeed. But then, Iraqis are judging politics in Washington from a great distance, and assuming that Americans will act sensibly. More than once, Americans in Washington have made the same assumptions about Iraqis -- and been proved wrong.
© 2007 The Washington Post Company

About That Peace Process

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/31/opinion/31mon2.html
December 31, 2007
Editorial
About That Peace Process
[editorial] [the most recent round of Middle East peacemaking that’s gone nowhere fast] [*********]
It didn’t take long for the glow of the Annapolis peace conference to wear off. Israelis and Palestinians have quickly fallen back into predictable destructive patterns. Arab countries have not done anywhere near enough to support the negotiations. Even the United States is behind on its pledges: because of bureaucratic wrangling and Israeli doubts, it has yet to establish a promised “mechanism” to monitor the two sides’ behavior and pressure them into meeting their commitments. [*******]

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/31/opinion/31mon2.html
December 31, 2007
Editorial
About That Peace Process
[editorial] [the most recent round of Middle East peacemaking that’s gone nowhere fast] [*********]
It didn’t take long for the glow of the Annapolis peace conference to wear off. Israelis and Palestinians have quickly fallen back into predictable destructive patterns. Arab countries have not done anywhere near enough to support the negotiations. Even the United States is behind on its pledges: because of bureaucratic wrangling and Israeli doubts, it has yet to establish a promised “mechanism” to monitor the two sides’ behavior and pressure them into meeting their commitments. [*******]
The American-led conference late last month achieved the minimum: an agreement by Israelis and Palestinians to begin immediate negotiations with the goal of reaching a peace treaty by the end of 2008. Since then, the two sides have failed even to name working groups that are supposed to grapple with the difficult core issues: borders, refugees, the future of Jerusalem and how to guarantee Israel’s security. [*****]
Next week President Bush will make his first trip since taking office to Israel and the Palestinian territories. His aides should use the time before then to press both sides to set up those working groups and lay out a calendar for negotiations. Annapolis was photo-op enough. Mr. Bush should use this visit to get real work started. [********]
In the last month, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators have held two meetings, in which all they did was revisit old grievances. Palestinians are right to complain that Israel violated its promise to halt settlements by announcing a tender for about 300 new apartments in Har Homa, and Israel is right to demand that the Palestinians act more aggressively to disband terrorist and militant groups.
The Israeli prime minister, Ehud Olmert, and the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, tried to calm tensions when they met last week and promised — again — to refrain from acts prejudicing a final peace treaty. Both are extremely weak leaders who need maximum outside support to make serious compromises.
Before he leaves Washington, Mr. Bush also needs to get his own house in order. His aides have been wrangling for weeks over who will head up the so-called monitoring mechanism and how it will operate. [govt] [*****] [nsc] [use psci 455]Those issues must be settled before Mr. Bush’s trip.
Some officials want to assign the task to the American consul general in Jerusalem. The job — which will entail a lot of arm-twisting — should go to someone with a lot higher profile and direct access to President Bush. Putting Gen. James Jones, a former NATO commander who recently became special envoy for Mideast security, in charge would make a lot more sense.
Arab states also need to do more to support Mr. Abbas and to reassure Israel that its compromises will bring greater acceptance. Given the price of oil, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait can certainly afford to provide more cash to the struggling Palestinian government. Egypt needs to completely disable tunnels used by Hamas militants in Gaza to smuggle in arms.
The danger that some extremist will try to destroy the negotiations with a mindless act of violence is never far. Which is all the more reason for Mr. Olmert and Mr. Abbas to push the process forward as fast as they can — and give their citizens a sense of the possibilities in peace. [********]
The last month’s stagnation, after the enthusiasm of Annapolis, is yet another reminder of why Mr. Bush cannot stand on the sidelines and hope that an agreement will somehow materialize.
Copyright 2007 The New York Times Company

Looking at America

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/31/opinion/31mon1.html
December 31, 2007
Editorial
Looking at America
[editorial] [the sacrifices in principles made in gsave] [though early ones are virtually inevitable, these have now gone on for extended periods] [*******]
There are too many moments these days when we cannot recognize our country. Sunday was one of them, as we read the account in The Times of how men in some of the most trusted posts in the nation plotted to cover up the torture of prisoners by Central Intelligence Agency interrogators [****]by destroying videotapes of their sickening behavior. It was impossible to see the founding principles of the greatest democracy in the contempt these men and their bosses showed for the Constitution, the rule of law and human decency.

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/31/opinion/31mon1.html
December 31, 2007
Editorial
Looking at America
[editorial] [the sacrifices in principles made in gsave] [though early ones are virtually inevitable, these have now gone on for extended periods] [*******]
There are too many moments these days when we cannot recognize our country. Sunday was one of them, as we read the account in The Times of how men in some of the most trusted posts in the nation plotted to cover up the torture of prisoners by Central Intelligence Agency interrogators [****]by destroying videotapes of their sickening behavior. It was impossible to see the founding principles of the greatest democracy in the contempt these men and their bosses showed for the Constitution, the rule of law and human decency.
It was not the first time in recent years we’ve felt this horror, this sorrowful sense of estrangement, not nearly. This sort of lawless behavior has become standard practice since Sept. 11, 2001. [and well before] [let us not pretend to forget some of the exigent circumstances used to justify equally bad behavior early in the Cold War] [the correction and reformation must come at some point] [but this is not unique to post-9/11 era] [****]
The country and much of the world was rightly and profoundly frightened by the single-minded hatred and ingenuity displayed by this new enemy. But there is no excuse for how President Bush and his advisers panicked — how they forgot that it is their responsibility to protect American lives and American ideals, that there really is no safety for Americans or their country when those ideals are sacrificed. [granted] [but the New York Times and other “reputable media” panicked as well and hardly criticized anything until late 2002] [their hands are not completely clean here] [Judith Miller was practically an administration PR person!] [*******]
Out of panic and ideology, President Bush squandered America’s position of moral and political leadership, swept aside international institutions and treaties, sullied America’s global image, and trampled on the constitutional pillars that have supported our democracy through the most terrifying and challenging times. These policies have fed the world’s anger and alienation and have not made any of us safer.
In the years since 9/11, we have seen American soldiers abuse, sexually humiliate, torment and murder prisoners in Afghanistan and Iraq. A few have been punished, but their leaders have never been called to account. We have seen mercenaries gun down Iraqi civilians with no fear of prosecution. We have seen the president, sworn to defend the Constitution, turn his powers on his own citizens, authorizing the intelligence agencies to spy on Americans, wiretapping phones and intercepting international e-mail messages without a warrant. [again, agreed] [but we have yet to learn the full details and we have learned that some leaders in Congress, including respectable Dem, Jay Rockefellor, Jane Harman, et al., sometimes did little more than acquiesce] [*****]
We have read accounts of how the government’s top lawyers huddled in secret after the attacks in New York and Washington and plotted ways to circumvent the Geneva Conventions — and both American and international law — to hold anyone the president chose indefinitely without charges or judicial review.
Those same lawyers then twisted other laws beyond recognition to allow Mr. Bush to turn intelligence agents into torturers, to force doctors to abdicate their professional oaths and responsibilities to prepare prisoners for abuse, and then to monitor the torment to make sure it didn’t go just a bit too far and actually kill them.
The White House used the fear of terrorism and the sense of national unity to ram laws through Congress that gave law-enforcement agencies far more power than they truly needed to respond to the threat — and at the same time fulfilled the imperial fantasies of Vice President Dick Cheney and others determined to use the tragedy of 9/11 to arrogate as much power as they could. [indeed, they have done this in unprecedented fashion, as far as I can tell] [*******]
Hundreds of men, swept up on the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq, were thrown into a prison in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, so that the White House could claim they were beyond the reach of American laws. Prisoners are held there with no hope of real justice, only the chance to face a kangaroo court where evidence and the names of their accusers are kept secret, and where they are not permitted to talk about the abuse they have suffered at the hands of American jailers.
In other foreign lands, the C.I.A. set up secret jails where “high-value detainees” were subjected to ever more barbaric acts, including simulated drowning. These crimes were videotaped, so that “experts” could watch them, and then the videotapes were destroyed, after consultation with the White House, in the hope that Americans would never know.
The C.I.A. contracted out its inhumanity to nations with no respect for life or law, sending prisoners — some of them innocents kidnapped on street corners and in airports — to be tortured into making false confessions, or until it was clear they had nothing to say and so were let go without any apology or hope of redress.
These are not the only shocking abuses of President Bush’s two terms in office, made in the name of fighting terrorism. There is much more — so much that the next president will have a full agenda simply discovering all the wrongs that have been done and then righting them.
We can only hope that this time, unlike 2004, American voters will have the wisdom to grant the awesome powers of the presidency to someone who has the integrity, principle and decency to use them honorably. Then when we look in the mirror as a nation, we will see, once again, the reflection of the United States of America. [a bit overwrought to say the least] [have they not looked as the slate of potential presidents on either side?] [“integrity, principle and decency” indeed] [**********]
Copyright 2007 The New York Times Company

Taliban Leader Expels Commander

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/31/world/asia/31afghan.html
December 31, 2007
Taliban Leader Expels Commander
By THE NEW YORK TIMES [Afghanistan] [hydra] [Pakistan became the clear staging area for operations into Afghanistan during 2007] [tactics previously unseen in Afghanistan appeared—beheadings and the like—as the insurgency ramped up] [U.S. not particularly attentive, except of course for the opium part of the puzzle, and 2007 may well be looked on as a tipping point] [the winter lull is almost upon the region] [******]
KANDAHAR, Afghanistan — The Taliban leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, has ordered his chief commander expelled from the movement for disobeying Taliban rules, [*****] a spokesman said in a statement over the weekend.

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/31/world/asia/31afghan.html
December 31, 2007
Taliban Leader Expels Commander
By THE NEW YORK TIMES [Afghanistan] [hydra] [Pakistan became the clear staging area for operations into Afghanistan during 2007] [tactics previously unseen in Afghanistan appeared—beheadings and the like—as the insurgency ramped up] [U.S. not particularly attentive, except of course for the opium part of the puzzle, and 2007 may well be looked on as a tipping point] [the winter lull is almost upon the region] [******]
KANDAHAR, Afghanistan — The Taliban leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, has ordered his chief commander expelled from the movement for disobeying Taliban rules, [*****] a spokesman said in a statement over the weekend.
The commander, Mansoor Dadullah, took over after his brother, Mullah Dadullah, was killed in May in Helmand Province. The Taliban statement said that Mansoor Dadullah was no longer the legitimate commander, [******] and that his men were advised to continue their fight without him. [one can hope for internal warfare but unlikely] [if nothing else, al Qaeda and other jihadis groups will probably seek to heal rifts] [*****]
Local news reports suggested that he and his men were giving the Taliban a bad name through their criminal behavior, including robbery and extortion. Mr. Dadullah denied that he had been expelled and said that reports of his dismissal were baseless. He said he continued to respect and obey Mullah Omar. [********]
NATO said in a statement that a roadside bomb killed a NATO soldier and wounded four others in southern Afghanistan on Sunday, The Associated Press reported.
Copyright 2007 The New York Times Company

At Least 16 Dead in Attacks in Iraq

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/01/world/middleeast/01iraq.html
January 1, 2008
At Least 16 Dead in Attacks in Iraq
By SOLOMON MOORE [-ir] [hydra] [insurgency] [bush administration’s “surge option” or “new way forward” underway] [some positive indicators of improvement] [nevertheless, violence while surge unfolds] [pentagon’s recent status report—pretty awful but also predictable] [followup] [“surge” continues amid mixed indicators] [a recent pickup in suicide bombers] [****]
BAGHDAD — Bomb attacks on Monday killed at least 16 people, including two Iraqi soldiers, in one of the most violent days in recent weeks even as Iraqi security forces stepped up their operations against insurgents across the country.

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/01/world/middleeast/01iraq.html
January 1, 2008
At Least 16 Dead in Attacks in Iraq
By SOLOMON MOORE [-ir] [hydra] [insurgency] [bush administration’s “surge option” or “new way forward” underway] [some positive indicators of improvement] [nevertheless, violence while surge unfolds] [pentagon’s recent status report—pretty awful but also predictable] [followup] [“surge” continues amid mixed indicators] [a recent pickup in suicide bombers] [****]
BAGHDAD — Bomb attacks on Monday killed at least 16 people, including two Iraqi soldiers, in one of the most violent days in recent weeks even as Iraqi security forces stepped up their operations against insurgents across the country.
In the deadliest attack, a truck bomb exploded at a checkpoint manned by neighborhood security volunteers in the Tarmiya area north of Baghdad. The blast killed at least five volunteers, who are members of a Sunni Arab tribe that has turned against the insurgency in recent months. At least four children were also killed in the explosion. Tarmiya was once a stronghold of the Sunni Arab insurgency.
In the restive Diyala province 60 miles north of the capital explosions killed five people and a woman detonated an explosive vest wounding at least five people in Baquba.
The attacks occurred two days after the appearance on Web sites of an hour-long audio recording by Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. In the message Mr. bin Laden speaks at length about Iraq and the Awakening Councils, a collection of more than 300 tribal councils comprising at least 70,000 Sunni Arabs who have renounced Al Qaeda and have joined forces with the American military.
Bin Laden warns his followers of “plots that are being hatched by the Zionist-Crusader alliance” to “steal the fruit of blessed jihad” in Iraq and urges them to resist American overtures.
“Recruiting hypocrite chieftains of tribes is one axis,” said Mr. bin Laden, according a translation posted by the United States government’s Open Source Center. “America, along with its agents in the region, is seeking through the other axis to form a new government — this government will be called a national unity government.”
Meanwhile, American and Iraqi forces staged several sweeps throughout the country against suspected Sunni Arab insurgents.
Commandos of the Iraqi national police said they killed seven suspected militants in the northern oil hub of Beiji.
In the southern city of Hilla, Brigadier Abdul Amer Kamel Abdullah of the Iraqi army said that his soldiers arrested 70 people over the weekend.
“Sixty of them were Al Qaeda fighters,” he said. The men were responsible for the assassination of a police commander five months ago, Mr. Abdullah said.
Kurdish Peshmerga fighters swept into the Diyala village of Jawalah, north of Baquba, and arrested at least a dozen Sunni Arab men and in the northern city of Kirkuk, American soldiers and Iraqi police detained 17 suspected militants.
And in Mahmoudiyah, about 20 miles south of Baghdad, an airborne force detained 18 suspected insurgents.
Monday’s violence highlighted the fragility of a weeks-long downturn in attacks in Iraq. American and Iraqi military officials have touted the recent lull as a success brought on by the recent surge of American forces, the recruitment of more than 100,000 Iraqi police officers and the 70,000 Sunni Arab security volunteers.
But earlier this week, General David H. Petraeus, the overall commander of United States forces in Iraq, characterized those security gains as “reversible.”
Copyright 2007 The New York Times Company

New Questions Arise in Killing of Ex-Premier

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/31/world/asia/31inquiry.html
December 31, 2007
New Questions Arise in Killing of Ex-Premier
By JANE PERLEZ [Pakistan] [south asia] [Pakistan as the new Afghanistan] [hydra central] [Pakistan seemingly teetering on the brink] [islamists, tribals, and jihadis striking back] [post-Bhutto assassination period] [Musharraf too must now—even more than before—fear for what comes next] [followup] [it appears truly the frontline of the jihadis-West confrontation] [interesting how Kashmir has been seemingl eclipsed by process] [******]
LAHORE, Pakistan — New details of Benazir Bhutto’s final moments, including indications that her doctors felt pressured to conform to government accounts of her death, fueled the arguments over her assassination on Sunday and added to the pressure on Pakistan’s leaders to accept an international inquiry.

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/31/world/asia/31inquiry.html
December 31, 2007
New Questions Arise in Killing of Ex-Premier
By JANE PERLEZ [Pakistan] [south asia] [Pakistan as the new Afghanistan] [hydra central] [Pakistan seemingly teetering on the brink] [islamists, tribals, and jihadis striking back] [post-Bhutto assassination period] [Musharraf too must now—even more than before—fear for what comes next] [followup] [it appears truly the frontline of the jihadis-West confrontation] [interesting how Kashmir has been seemingl eclipsed by process] [******]
LAHORE, Pakistan — New details of Benazir Bhutto’s final moments, including indications that her doctors felt pressured to conform to government accounts of her death, fueled the arguments over her assassination on Sunday and added to the pressure on Pakistan’s leaders to accept an international inquiry.
Athar Minallah, a board member of the hospital where Ms. Bhutto was treated, released her medical report along with an open letter showing that her doctors wanted to distance themselves from the government theory that Ms. Bhutto had died by hitting her head on a lever of her car’s sunroof during the attack. [*****]
In his letter, Mr. Minallah, who is also a prominent lawyer, said the doctors believed that an autopsy was needed to provide the answers to how she actually died. Their request for one last Thursday was denied by the local police chief.
Pakistani and Western security experts said the government’s insistence that Ms. Bhutto, a former prime minister, was not killed by a bullet was intended to deflect attention from the lack of government security around her. On Sunday, Pakistani newspapers covered their front pages with photographs showing a man apparently pointing a gun at her from just yards away. [*******]
Her vehicle came under attack by a gunman and suicide bomber as she left a political rally in Rawalpindi, where the Pakistani Army keeps its headquarters, and where the powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency has a strong presence.
The government’s explanation, that Ms. Bhutto died after hitting her head as she ducked from the gunfire or was tossed by the force of the suicide blast, has been greeted with disbelief by her supporters, ordinary Pakistanis and medical experts. While some of the mystery could be cleared up by exhuming the body, it is not clear whether Ms. Bhutto’s family would give permission, such is their distrust of the government.
Mr. Minallah distributed the medical report with his open letter to the Pakistani news media and The New York Times. He said the doctor who wrote the report, Mohammad Mussadiq Khan, the principal professor of surgery at the Rawalpindi General Hospital, told him on the night of Ms. Bhutto’s death that she had died of a bullet wound. [*****]
Dr. Khan declined through Mr. Minallah to speak with a reporter on the grounds that he was an employee of a government hospital and was fearful of government reprisals if he did not support its version of events.
The medical report, prepared with six other doctors, does not specifically mention a bullet because the actual cause of the head wound was to be left to an autopsy, Mr. Minallah said. The doctors had stressed to him that “without an autopsy it is not at all possible to determine as to what had caused the injury,” he wrote.
But the chief of police in Rawalpindi, Saud Aziz, “did not agree” to the autopsy request by the doctors, Mr. Minallah said in his letter.
A former senior Pakistani police official, Wajahat Latif, who headed the Federal Investigative Agency in the early 1990s, said that in “any case of a suspected murder an autopsy is mandatory.” To waive an autopsy, Mr. Latif said, relatives were required to apply for permission.
At a news conference Sunday, Ms. Bhutto’s husband, Asif Ali Zardari, said he had declined a request for a post-mortem examination. “It was an insult to my wife, an insult to the sister of the nation, an insult to the mother of the nation,” he said. “I know their forensic reports are useless. I refuse to give them her last remains.”
The question of an autopsy has become central to the circumstances of Ms. Bhutto’s death because of conflicting versions put forward by the Pakistani government, which have stirred an already deep well of distrust of the government among Ms. Bhutto’s supporters and other Pakistanis.
On the night Ms. Bhutto was assassinated, an unidentified Interior Ministry spokesman was quoted by the official Pakistani news agency as saying that she had died of a “bullet wound in the neck by a suicide bomber.” [*********]
The next day, Brig. Javed Iqbal Cheema, the Interior Ministry spokesman, recast that version of events, saying at a news conference that Ms. Bhutto died of a wound sustained when she hit her head on a lever attached to the sun roof of the vehicle as she ducked a bullet and was thrown about by the force of the blast. “Three shots were fired but they missed her,” Brigadier Cheema said. “Then there was an explosion.”
The new images of the men who appear to have been Ms. Bhutto’s assassins showed one dressed in a sleeveless black waistcoat and rimless sunglasses, and holding aloft what appeared to be a gun. He had a short haircut and wore the kind of attire reminiscent of plainclothes intelligence officials, though Al Qaeda and other militants have also been known to dress attackers in Western-style clothing in order to disguise them. [******]
That man is seen standing in front of another whose head is covered in a shawl in the style of Pashtun men from the Pakistan’s tribal areas, where Al Qaeda has regrouped in the past year. He is described in the newspaper Dawn as the suicide bomber.
Mr. Minallah, the hospital board member, said Ms. Bhutto’s doctors raised the likelihood of a bullet killing her in their report, when they wrote, “Two to three tiny radio-densities underneath fracture segment are observed on both projections.”
The report said the doctors tried for 41 minutes to revive her. It said “the patient was pulseless and was not breathing,” when she arrived at the hospital. “A wound was present on the right temporoparietal region, through which blood was trickling down and whitish material which looked like brain matter was visible in the wound,” it said.
Ms. Bhutto’s colleagues who were in the vehicle with her said the interior was covered in blood, and the doctors wrote that “her clothes were soaked with blood.”
An account of her death that did not involve a gunshot wound was the optimal explanation for the government, said Bruce Riedel, an expert on Pakistan at the Brookings Institution in Washington, and a former member of the National Security Council in the Clinton administration. “If there is a gunshot wound, the security was abysmal,” Mr. Riedel said. The government did not want to be exposed on its careless approach to security, [******] he said.
On Sunday, Ms. Bhutto’s husband, Mr. Zardari, said he received a call from the Punjab home secretary on Thursday evening with a request for his permission for a post-mortem examination. He said he refused because he did not trust the government investigation to prove the cause of her death.
In ordinary circumstances, an autopsy runs counter to Islamic belief that a body should not be tampered with and should be buried as quickly as possible. But several Pakistanis said that in certain classes of Muslim society, particularly the better educated and more urban people, autopsies were not ruled out on religious grounds.
There were also provisions under Pakistani law for the exhumation of a body and a delayed post-mortem, Mr. Latif, the former senior Pakistani police official, said. In those cases, the state or a family can ask a magistrate for exhumation. The magistrate then forms a board of doctors to carry out the procedures, he said.
An international inquiry on Ms. Bhutto’s death could not be carried out without an exhumation, a difficult decision in a Muslim country, Mr. Latif said.
In response to a question at a heated news conference Saturday, Brigadier Cheema, the Interior Ministry spokesman, said the government was ready to exhume the body if the family asked.
But Ms. Bhutto’s supporters noted that the family and the party were so furious at President Musharraf, whom many of them blame for her death, that it was unlikely the Bhuttos would trust an exhumation that involved the government.
Pressure came from a number of quarters for an inquiry modeled after one carried out by the United Nations after the assassination of Rafik Hariri, a former Lebanese prime minister, in 2005. [candidate Clinton hitched her star to that the international inquiry a la Hariri model] [yesterday on CNN] [**********]
Though the Lebanon inquiry has moved very slowly, American and British officials, as well as an increasing number of Pakistanis, said that an investigation under the United Nations or some other international effort would restore confidence in the Pakistani government.
On Sunday a conference of Ms. Bhutto’s party, the Pakistan Peoples Party, called for an inquiry led by the United Nations.
The Speaker of the House of Representatives in the United States Congress, Nancy Pelosi, said Saturday that the Bush administration should condition its future aid to Pakistan on its willingness to undertake an independent international inquiry.
David Miliband, the British foreign secretary, said Britain was ready to offer whatever help was needed.
Brigadier Cheema made clear, however, that an international inquiry was not in the cards. “At this point in time we are quite confident with the kind of progress that is going on with our inquiries,” he said Sunday.
Foreign experts did not have the expertise, he said, to deal with the peculiarities of tribal areas that are the base of the nation’s terrorist activities. “This is not just an ordinary criminal case where you only need forensic expert,” he said. “We understand the dynamics better.”
Somini Sengupta contributed reporting from Karachi, Pakistan.
Copyright 2007 The New York Times Company

Opposition Parties Vow to Proceed With Jan. 8 Election

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/31/world/asia/31pakistan.html
December 31, 2007
Opposition Parties Vow to Proceed With Jan. 8 Election
By SOMINI SENGUPTA [Pakistan] [south asia] [Pakistan as the new Afghanistan] [hydra central] [Pakistan seemingly teetering on the brink] [islamists, tribals, and jihadis striking back] [post-Bhutto assassination period] [Musharraf too must now—even more than before—fear for what comes next] [followup] [it appears truly the frontline of the jihadis-West confrontation] [interesting how Kashmir has been seemingl eclipsed by process] [******]
NAUDERO, Pakistan — Three days after the violent killing of its leader, Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan’s largest political party on Sunday picked her 19-year-old son to succeed her as chairman and vowed to forge ahead with elections next week, immediately creating a new quandary for the government about whether to delay the vote.

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/31/world/asia/31pakistan.html
December 31, 2007
Opposition Parties Vow to Proceed With Jan. 8 Election
By SOMINI SENGUPTA [Pakistan] [south asia] [Pakistan as the new Afghanistan] [hydra central] [Pakistan seemingly teetering on the brink] [islamists, tribals, and jihadis striking back] [post-Bhutto assassination period] [Musharraf too must now—even more than before—fear for what comes next] [followup] [it appears truly the frontline of the jihadis-West confrontation] [interesting how Kashmir has been seemingl eclipsed by process] [******]
NAUDERO, Pakistan — Three days after the violent killing of its leader, Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan’s largest political party on Sunday picked her 19-year-old son to succeed her as chairman and vowed to forge ahead with elections next week, immediately creating a new quandary for the government about whether to delay the vote.
The moves by Ms. Bhutto’s opposition party, the Pakistan Peoples Party, were clearly aimed at marshaling an outpouring of grief and anger to electoral advantage in the Jan. 8 parliamentary election. The other main opposition party, led by Nawaz Sharif, another former prime minister, also decided Sunday to call off his previously announced boycott of the vote.
Aides to President Pervez Musharraf have suggested that the election could be postponed, perhaps for months, because of the chaos that has engulfed the country since Ms. Bhutto, the former prime minister returned from exile, was killed while campaigning Thursday. But now the prospect of a delay could further infuriate Ms. Bhutto’s supporters and allies, pressuring Mr. Musharraf to hold the vote and risk a huge defeat at the polls.
Elections officials in Pakistan said Monday that they would take another day to decide on the timing of the polls, according to The Associated Press.
The announcement that Ms. Bhutto’s first-born son, Bilawal, an Oxford undergraduate with no political experience, would lead her party was made at a chaotic news conference at the family’s ancestral home here in a southern Pakistan village.
His father, Asif Ali Zardari, said he would manage the chairmanship on his son’s behalf until he finished his university degree, for a minimum of three years.
The decision to place burden of blood and history on the son reflects not only an abiding dynastic streak in South Asian politics — three generations of the Nehru-Gandhi family have dominated politics in India, and hereditary politics pervade Sri Lanka and Bangladesh as well — but also how much the Pakistan Peoples Party relies on the Bhutto family name and legacy to bind its supporters.
In keeping with his new mantle, the new chairman took a new name, embracing his mother’s maiden name as the newly anointed Bhutto scion.
“My mother always said democracy is the best revenge,” he told reporters in a brief address.
The elder Mr. Zardari said his son would henceforth be known as Bilawal Bhutto Zardari. He instructed reporters not to ask his son any further questions, saying he was “of a tender age.”
Later, in the backyard of the family’s house, the younger Mr. Zardari said in an interview that he had been tutored by his mother to play a role in Pakistani politics, but only after he completes his university education. “There was always a sense of fear I wouldn’t be able to live up to her expectations,” he said. “I hope I will.”
Asked about his most immediate challenge, he said, “First to finish my degree.”
That would appear to rule out any possibility that Ms. Bhutto’s son could become the new leader of Pakistan until he was significantly older. Nonetheless, the elder Mr. Zardari said in an interview, “As her son, he will become a uniting force.”
The younger Mr. Zardari is a student of history at Christ Church College at Oxford University, his mother’s alma mater.
Mr. Zardari said that his wife had expressed the wish in her will that he be left in charge of the party, but that he had decided, with the consent of the executive committee, which met Sunday afternoon at the close of a three-day mourning period, to pass the baton to his son.
He said the will was written on Oct. 16, two days before her return to Pakistan, and given to him after her death, which is when he learned that she had chosen him to succeed her.
“It’s not an easy chair to sit on,” the elder Mr. Zardari said in the interview. “A, she leaves me. B, she ties me in this. To say the least, it’s overbearing.”
Senior party officials said, too, that the younger Mr. Zardari would be a far less controversial titular head than his father, who had been accused of a raft of corruption charges, jailed for a total of 11 years, and blamed in some quarters for some of Ms. Bhutto’s political woes.
It could not be a more difficult time for the party. Ms. Bhutto had held together a large and diverse organization, and even if, on the back of public grief, it were to win the elections, it would be likely to be under great pressure to bring a semblance of stability to a nation racked by a wave of extremist violence.
At the news conference, the elder Mr. Zardari said he would not run in the election and therefore would not be the party’s prime ministerial candidate.
That job, he said, would probably go to the party vice president, the veteran party leader Makhdoom Amin Fahim, but that was a decision, he added, that would have to be made by party leaders.
Mr. Zardari went on to say later in the interview that it would be “very difficult” for the party to survive without Ms. Bhutto. “My biggest job is to keep it from falling apart,” he said.
Ms. Bhutto, 54, was killed Thursday evening as she left a party rally in the city of Rawalpindi, when her car was struck by gunfire and a suicide bombing. Ms. Bhutto’s party and family insist that she was shot in the head. The government disputes it, saying that she struck her head fatally on the sunroof of her car.
Her party appealed Sunday for an international inquiry into her death, along the lines of the investigation into the killing of Rafik Hariri, the former prime minister of Lebanon.
The younger Mr. Zardari’s rise echoes the chilling, emotionally resonant path of his mother, who was thrust into public life after her father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was hanged in 1979 by order of the military ruler, Gen. Mohammad Zia ul-Haq.
Shortly before the official announcement of his ascension at a crowded news conference came a ceremonious rearrangement of the dais. His newly constructed name was pinned to the back of a high-backed red chair, which was then adorned with a cushion and placed at the center of a long table. He entered, dressed in a black salwar kameez, the traditional long tunic and pants, and Armani glasses, biting his lips and carrying a portrait of his mother. He promised to carry on his mother’s legacy as “a symbol of the federation.”
Rehman Malik, a senior party official, said Ms. Bhutto had asked him to coach her son in the basic workings of politics and government, from teaching him how to assess others to taking him to the halls of Parliament.
“She has groomed up her husband,” he said. “She was grooming her son also. She was telling me many times he will grow up and take over the party.”
For his part, the younger Mr. Zardari said he had discussed with his mother the prospects of entering politics, but avoided getting into details about who would take over after her. “We always tried not to have this specific conversation because we hoped this day would come, if not never, then far, far in the future,” he said.
In the interview, he spoke quietly, but politely, in the backyard of a crowded house in a remote village in a country where he had spent little time. He and his two younger siblings were raised mostly in Dubai.
A cluster of relatives approached to embrace. “You raised our hopes just now,” one man told him.
The young man took that in, also quietly, and waited for them to pass before speaking again. He said he feared for the survival of the country. When reminded that he had not grown up here, his answer came swiftly. He said he was lucky to have been reared by his mother, who knew the country well. Asked if she had ever encouraged him to succeed her as the leader of the party, he was vague.
“She always said I had to finish my education before I got into politics,” he answered. “She always said I would do something for Pakistan.”
Politics here is as much about matters of the heart as anything else. Which is why Abida Hussain, another senior party official, when asked about the options facing the party at this crucial juncture, said simply, “It’s Bilawal.”
Copyright 2007 The New York Times Company

Bhutto's Son Chosen As Eventual Party Chief

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/30/AR2007123000223.html
Bhutto's Son Chosen As Eventual Party Chief
19-Year-Old's Father To Preside in Interim
By Griff Witte
Washington Post Foreign Service
Monday, December 31, 2007; A01 [Pakistan] [south asia] [Pakistan as the new Afghanistan] [hydra central] [Pakistan seemingly teetering on the brink] [islamists, tribals, and jihadis striking back] [post-Bhutto assassination period] [Musharraf too must now—even more than before—fear for what comes next] [followup] [it appears truly the frontline of the jihadis-West confrontation] [interesting how Kashmir has been seemingl eclipsed by process] [******]
KARACHI, Pakistan, Dec. 30 -- Pakistan's largest and most storied political party chose Sunday to continue its dynastic traditions, anointing the 19-year-old son of slain former prime minister Benazir Bhutto to be her ultimate successor but picking her husband to lead for now.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/30/AR2007123000223.html
Bhutto's Son Chosen As Eventual Party Chief
19-Year-Old's Father To Preside in Interim
By Griff Witte
Washington Post Foreign Service
Monday, December 31, 2007; A01 [Pakistan] [south asia] [Pakistan as the new Afghanistan] [hydra central] [Pakistan seemingly teetering on the brink] [islamists, tribals, and jihadis striking back] [post-Bhutto assassination period] [Musharraf too must now—even more than before—fear for what comes next] [followup] [it appears truly the frontline of the jihadis-West confrontation] [interesting how Kashmir has been seemingl eclipsed by process] [******]
KARACHI, Pakistan, Dec. 30 -- Pakistan's largest and most storied political party chose Sunday to continue its dynastic traditions, anointing the 19-year-old son of slain former prime minister Benazir Bhutto to be her ultimate successor but picking her husband to lead for now.
The selections mean that the Pakistan People's Party, which casts itself as the voice of democracy in Pakistan, will stay in family hands for a third generation.
Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, who had largely been shielded from the spotlight by his mother and has not lived in Pakistan since he was a young boy, will lead the party when he finishes his studies at Oxford University.
Speaking briefly but forcefully at a news conference in the Bhutto family's ancestral home, he said he would strive to honor his mother's legacy. "The party's long and historic struggle will continue with renewed vigor," he said. "My mother always said democracy is the best revenge."
Bhutto's husband, Asif Ali Zardari, whose reputation has long been tainted by corruption charges, will run the party for at least the next several years. He said Sunday that the succession strategy reflected the wishes of his wife, who died in a gun-and-bomb attack at a rally Thursday afternoon.
The party's new leaders -- neither of whom had been a major player in Pakistani politics -- take over at an especially turbulent time for the country, with elections on the horizon and President Pervez Musharraf clinging to power amid widespread unrest.
Asif Zardari quickly announced that the party will compete in the parliamentary vote scheduled for Jan. 8. Another opposition party, led by former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, indicated it will do the same.
But Musharraf allies strongly hinted that the election would be postponed, possibly for months. "Delaying the election is very much in the cards," said Tariq Azim Khan, information secretary for the major pro-Musharraf party. "If you ask me personally if I would go ahead, I would say it would be unfair to go out and campaign in these sad times."
Although the Bush administration pressed Pakistani leaders last week to keep to the election schedule, the State Department said Sunday that it had no objections to a slight postponement.
"If the people on the ground think this is not the time for an election, that is fine," said spokesman Robert McInturff. "But we would want to see an alternative date. We do not want to see an indefinite delay."
Bhutto's killing Thursday was followed by unrest across the country, as rioting broke out in major cities as well as small villages. The atmosphere remained tense Sunday, with army deployments in several key areas, but the violence eased. Still, Bhutto's legions of supporters continued to blame Musharraf for her death.
Zardari called Sunday for the United Nations to lead an international inquiry into his wife's killing, while conceding that he had declined to give Pakistani officials permission to conduct an autopsy. "Their forensic reports are useless," he said angrily, calling the suggestion of an autopsy "an insult to my wife, to the sister of the nation, to the mother of the nation."
The Bhuttos are often compared to the Kennedys because of their tendency toward charismatic leaders who meet tragic ends. Benazir Bhutto's father, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, himself a former prime minister, was hanged in 1979 by the military dictator who overthrew him. Her two brothers died in mysterious and violent circumstances.
The young man representing the newest generation of Bhuttos -- who added the famous name for the first time Sunday -- indicated he is acutely aware of that record, saying the chairmanship of the Pakistan People's Party is a position "that often is occupied by martyrs."
Nonetheless, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari said he planned to return to Pakistan after he graduates from Oxford "to lead the party as my mother wanted me to."
Asif Zardari, [*****] [Bhutto’s husband] meanwhile, left no doubt Sunday that he will be in charge in the interim. He pointedly asked reporters not to address questions to his son, and he lashed out at Musharraf's allies, calling them "the killer party."
Zardari, who wed Benazir Bhutto in an arranged marriage in 1987, is a controversial choice to lead the party, and some insiders worry it could fracture. During his wife's two terms as prime minister in the late 1980s and 1990s, he was known as "Mr. 10 Percent" for his reputation for taking money off the top of government deals. He served an extended jail sentence under Musharraf that stemmed from the alleged corruption.
"Zardari is not very much liked in the party. He goes for big hotels, world's best addresses. He wants to live like a prince abroad," said Rafiq Safi, a longtime party activist.
Zardari also has many critics in Western capitals, including Washington, which could further complicate U.S. hopes that Musharraf and the PPP might form a coalition that would unify moderate forces in Pakistan against extremism. "The U.S. is not going to be excited about working with Zardari," said Daniel Markey, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. [********]
But the pressure to keep the party's leadership in family hands was intense, reflecting the unorthodox nature of the PPP as a party for the impoverished masses that is largely run by a collection of wealthy landlords -- the Bhutto family being by far the most prominent.
For true believers in the magic of the Bhutto name, people who are not members of the clan are ineligible to lead. Even Zardari is viewed with suspicion because he came to the family through marriage, not blood.
"There's something wrong with the region," said former party official Makhdoom Khaleeq Zaman, referring to the South Asian tendency for political dynasties. "It's not very democratic."
While Benazir Bhutto was groomed to lead the party by her father, it is unclear whether her son went through the same training.
His birth in 1988 -- on the eve of elections that Bhutto won, making her the first female prime minister of a Muslim nation -- generated headlines around the world. But after that, she took great pains to guard his privacy. He largely grew up in exile in London and Dubai, and little is known about him outside the family.
In her autobiography, Bhutto described the birth of her first child, calling him "the most celebrated and politically controversial baby in the history of Pakistan."
"There were congratulatory gunshots being fired outside the hospital, the beating of drums" and cries of "Long live Bhutto," she wrote.
On Sunday, when Bilawal Bhutto Zardari was reintroduced to the world, dozens of emotional party activists repeated that cheer and added a new one: "Bilawal, move forward! We are with you."
Correspondent Emily Wax in Islamabad, staff writer Robin Wright in Washington and special correspondent Imtiaz Ali in Peshawar contributed to this report.
© 2007 The Washington Post Company

Jihadists in Jails Win Leverage With Protests

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/31/world/africa/31prison.html
December 31, 2007
Jihadists in Jails Win Leverage With Protests
By MICHAEL MOSS and SOUAD MEKHENNET [Morocco] [Maghreb] [northern Africa] [jihadis] [hydra] [Islamists too] [modus operandi in growing number of countries] [gsave not over] [as has been seen in any number of Islamic countries—as disparate as Morocco, Saudi, Pakistan—the “authorities” are often full on sympathizers to various degrees: from sympathizers of jihadism to sympathizers of Islamists] [**********]
CASABLANCA, Morocco — Ahmed Rafiki sprawled on the makeshift couch in his cell, a fresh red henna dye in his long hair and beard. [*****]

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/31/world/africa/31prison.html
December 31, 2007
Jihadists in Jails Win Leverage With Protests
By MICHAEL MOSS and SOUAD MEKHENNET [Morocco] [Maghreb] [northern Africa] [jihadis] [hydra] [Islamists too] [modus operandi in growing number of countries] [gsave not over] [as has been seen in any number of Islamic countries—as disparate as Morocco, Saudi, Pakistan—the “authorities” are often full on sympathizers to various degrees: from sympathizers of jihadism to sympathizers of Islamists] [**********]
CASABLANCA, Morocco — Ahmed Rafiki sprawled on the makeshift couch in his cell, a fresh red henna dye in his long hair and beard. [*****]
Known to other militants as the father of Moroccan jihadists, he was convicted in 2003 of leading young men to fight Americans in Afghanistan. [****] But here in Oukacha Prison, Mr. Rafiki, an Islamist cleric, is serving the final months of his sentence in style.
His kitchen and larder are stocked three times a week by his two wives. His curtained doorway leads to a private garden and bath. He has two radios and a television, a reading stand for his Koran and a wardrobe of crisply ironed Islamic attire.
“In my case,” he said with a smile, “the people treat me well.”
Hardly a scene of harsh interrogation and detention for which Moroccan prisons are known, Mr. Rafiki’s plush prison life is evidence of an awkward balancing act between the crackdown on militants in many countries and the power those militants can hold over the authorities. [********]
Through hunger strikes and protests, Mr. Rafiki and Oukacha’s 65 other militant inmates have won perks — including exclusive use of the conjugal rooms — that make them the envy of the prison’s 7,600 other inmates. [**********]
One recent morning, a prisoner advocate handed the warden a long list of inmates not linked to terrorism cases who were demanding equal time with their wives.
“‘Why do they get much more rights than we get here?’” the advocate, Assia El Ouadie, said the other prisoners constantly asked her. “‘Do you want us to become terrorism prisoners, and then we will get those rights?’” [*********] [to be sure, a perverse incentive system]
Even as more and more militants are imprisoned around the world — often by governments with records of conducting extreme interrogations — the prisoners are managing to gain a kind of crude leverage [******] over security officials who are struggling to figure out how to handle them.
Draconian, or even strict, treatment of radical inmates can lead to prison unrest and public condemnation, particularly in countries with sizable Muslim populations. [****] At the same time, officials fear that militants given free rein are more likely to turn prisons into prime grounds for radicalization and recruiting. [*****]
“More than any time in the modern history of terrorism, the prisons have become a key front in the war on terror,” [********]Dennis Pluchinsky, a former senior intelligence analyst at the State Department, wrote in a report for the United States government earlier this year.
He estimated that there were 5,000 jihadi inmates and detainees worldwide, not counting those held in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that only 15 percent had received life sentences or the death penalty, meaning the rest would eventually be set free. [*******]
Here in Morocco, across the Arab world and in European countries like Spain and France, there is a growing realization that catching and convicting militants is hardly the end of the problem. [*****] Many are getting sentences of only a few years, and Arab governments continue to release hundreds every year through mass pardons aimed at quelling fundamentalist Islamic movements. [*******]
Last April, a meeting in Morocco on radicalization of Islamic prisoners drew representatives of 21 countries. “There is some confusion as to how, in overcrowded and underfinanced prison systems, you deal with these special case prisoners,” said a British official who helped run the meeting, who spoke anonymously, citing normal diplomatic strictures. British officials acknowledge that they erred in the early 1980s when they gave Irish Republican Army prisoners their own cellblock, only to see them carry out fatal hunger strikes that won public support. But the authorities say militant Islamic inmates are even more sophisticated.
Manuals from Al Qaeda instruct prisoners on how to resist interrogations, wage hunger strikes and use prison time to strengthen religious convictions. This month, Australian officials said a group of 40 Muslim inmates, not previously considered extremists, were found using guidance from a manual to organize themselves and stage protests at a prison near Sydney. [*****] Officials responded by scattering them among other prisons.
But that is hardly a fail-safe strategy. When members of the Qaeda-inspired group Fatah al Islam, which fought the Lebanese Army for three months this year, were locked up in Roumieh Prison near Beirut, Lebanese authorities found they had been using smuggled cellphones to contact other jailed militants [*******] and their families outside.
Some Middle Eastern and European countries are using moderate imams in prisons in hopes of quelling the extremist fervor. “You have to fight their ideology with Islam and against their wrong interpretation of Islam,” [*****] said a top Syrian security official. [*********]
The biggest concern is that militants will return to the fight once released, despite having been imprisoned, or perhaps because of it.
That is what Mohammed Mazouz did after he was freed in 2004 from the American detention center at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. He was picked up last fall in Morocco as he was preparing to leave for Iraq to fight American troops. [****] “I can’t forget what they did with me,” he said of his American captors, during an interview in a Moroccan prison. “I can’t forget all my life. I hate it.”
He was released two days later.
Rise of Fundamentalism
Morocco had few Islamic militants in its prisons during the 1990s, [****] when leftists, angered by the country’s poverty and official corruption, posed more of a threat to the monarchy. King Mohammed VI began a series of liberalizations after assuming the throne in 1999. Yet a new challenge was rising, as the Islamic fundamentalism sweeping the Arab world gathered public support in Morocco. While the most popular Muslim leaders professed nonviolence, radicals began planning terrorist attacks. [*********]
In May 2003, eight weeks after the United States invaded Iraq, Morocco was hit by its worst terrorist attack ever. A dozen suicide bombers struck a cafe, a hotel and Jewish establishments in Casablanca, killing more than 30 people. [*****] The struggle between the militants and the government landed in Morocco’s prisons.
Hundreds of suspects were detained. In prison interviews with The New York Times, five men said they had been tortured during interrogations, subjected to a method of anal rape known as “the bottle treatment.”
In all, more than 1,400 men were convicted of terrorism-related charges and imprisoned. In May 2005, the militants started a 28-day hunger strike, using contraband cellphones to rally compatriots throughout the prison system. [***********]
A militant former convict, Abderahim Mohtad, started a prisoner advocacy group and stirred public support for the strikers. “Their strength comes from their belief in God,” he said in his storefront office, where one wall is covered with pictures of militant inmates. “You tortured him, you didn’t get anything from him. You arrested him and you didn’t get anything from him. You judged them, and some of them had been judged with death, and they are still laughing.”
While the Casablanca bombings had dampened public sympathy for terrorist groups, animosity toward the United States ran strong. The jailed militants were seen as motivated by the war in Iraq and by Morocco’s role in America’s campaign against terrorism. [**]
Morocco has participated in a Sahara-wide counterterrorism effort financed by the United States, by helping to gather and share intelligence and by detaining terrorism suspects. [but it’s happening in many places so the Sahara-wide counterterrorism program financed by the U.S. is hardly a causal connection as suggested here] [*****]
Many inmates protested that they had no role in the bombings, and Moroccan authorities acknowledged in recent interviews that many had been arrested simply for embracing an extreme ideology.
When the strike ended, courts reduced the sentences of some militants, and the king pardoned several hundred more. Those who remained in prison began to get special privileges.
“They started with hunger strikes and problems,” said Abdelati Belghazi, director of Zaki Prison, north of the capital, Rabat. “The media and organizations started to get involved, and because we wanted them to stop, we had to give them some of the things that they have requested. And then they started to feel much stronger because they saw that they received what they wanted. They requested more and more.”
More Space in Cells
At Zaki, one of two prisons where The Times interviewed militant inmates and prison officials, the 309 prisoners held as terrorists have much more space — averaging 3 men in each cell, compared with 22 per cell for the prison’s 3,500 regular inmates, a prison official said.
They also have a system for lodging complaints, a fact that at times irritates Ms. Ouadie, the prisoner advocate appointed by the king to mediate disputes.
“The guards threw a Koran on the ground,” a militant representative in Zaki, Yassine Aliouine, complained. Since the guards are Muslims, too, Ms. Ouadie said, it is more likely that the book simply fell.
“Yes, but they saw it and didn’t pick it up,” Mr. Aliouine replied.
When Ms. Ouadie raised the issue with the prison director, Mr. Belghazi, he played a videotape of the search where the Koran was said to have been abused, and a startlingly different scene emerged.
The video showed the guards collecting a bucketful of contraband electronics, including cellphones. They found a poster that listed militant groups and their leaders. They discovered a jackknife baked in a loaf of bread, and the warden dumped a dozen more blades on a table that he said the militants had tossed out of their windows. [*******]
Despite such periodic seizures, militant inmates in several Moroccan prisons were able to call Times reporters, both before and after the visits.
Oukacha, in Casablanca, is arguably the best address for jailed militants. Even the director, El Maati Boubiza, said he was amazed when he took the job last year. “Their cell doors were open 24 hours,” he said. “Only they could use the conjugal rooms, and they were using them starting at 6 a.m.”
Cellblock 5, where many of the militants live, functions like a small village. The inmates hold boxing matches. Sheep are slaughtered for the holidays. In one of the two kitchens, a cook proudly displayed his cutlery and an array of containers that held fresh deliveries from inmates’ families.
Down the hall, Hassan Kettani, a Islamic theorist renowned in global jihad circles, declined to be interviewed on videotape — until he changed out of his everyday clothes.
A few minutes later, he sauntered down to the lobby, unescorted, and posed in a white robe and golden headdress. “We were in very bad shape when we were captured,” he said of the days before the first hunger strike. “It was hard.”
The militants have also sought to draw public support by writing letters to local newspapers and jihadist Web sites, alternately complaining about their incarceration and presenting it as a duty gladly fulfilled. [***********]
“In our religion, we believe in destiny, and I believe that God has written this to me and I have to go through that,” said Mr. Rifiki, the militant cleric, whose group, Salafia Jihadia — or Fight of Ancestors — is considered a terrorist organization that reaches from North Africa to Europe.
Moderating the views of the hardest militants may be an impossibility, but Ms. Ouadie said prison authorities could help stop the cycle of radicalization by separating moderate Islamist prisoners from the more extreme ones. “I would arrange Islamic teachings and also treat them in a humane way,” she said.
Still, the terrorist attacks continue in Morocco and, despite the concessions to militant inmates, so do harsh interrogations by the police and intelligence agents, according to interviews with inmates.
Allegations of Torture
While Moroccan officials declined to comment on the allegations of torture, the accusers include a former investigations officer with the national security service, Abderahim Tarik, who was arrested last year on suspicion of ties to a militant group, which he denies.
Mr. Tarik said that for six days at a police station named Temara, he was beaten with sticks, stripped naked, doused with cold water and shocked with an electric prod on his feet and anus. “They started to tell me we will bring your wife tomorrow and rape her directly in front of you,” he said.
Abdelfattah Raydi exemplifies the cycle of arrests, incarceration and attacks.
Mr. Raydi, arrested in 2003 as a militant sympathizer, said in a letter he wrote in Oukacha to a human rights group, obtained by The Times, that he underwent both physical and psychological torture. “He beat me until I fainted,” he wrote of one of his questioners. Abdelfatif Amarin and two other cellmates of Mr. Raydi’s said that Mr. Raydi told them that he had been given the “bottle treatment.”
“I remember that he had nightmares and cried during his sleep,” said one inmate, asking not to be identified for fear of reprisal by prison officials. “He told me several times, ‘I swear to God, if I would have known that they would do this to me, I would have killed myself before.’” [***********]
In prison, Mr. Raydi spent time with a militant leader named Hassan al-Khattab, according to inmates, and they were both released in the king’s mass pardon in 2005. [*****]Mr. Raydi married, found work and moved away from the shantytown where he was raised with six brothers in a one-room shack, friends and relatives said.
Then last year, according to the authorities, he joined Mr. Khattab in a disrupted terrorist plot. Mr. Khattab was tried and awaits sentencing. But Mr. Raydi evaded capture, and was being sought by the authorities when he walked into an Internet cafe this March and blew himself up [********]when the owner grew suspicious and called the police.
Chased by the authorities, Mr. Raydi’s brother and four other men wearing suicide vests blew themselves up in the following weeks, and the manhunt has produced dozens of new arrests.
On Nov. 8, 51 suspects, including one woman and two of Mr. Raydi’s brothers, made their first appearance in court. Among them was the son of a man arrested in the 2003 sweeps. “Do they treat you well, Hamid?” his grandmother asked after the hearing, pressing her hand to the glass partition. “How is your health?”
“All is good, grandmother,” he replied. “Are you coming to visit me later?”
Margot Williams contributed reporting from New York.
Copyright 2007 The New York Times Company

December 30, 2007

Immigration Is Defying Easy Answers

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/30/us/politics/30issuesI.html
December 30, 2007
Immigration Is Defying Easy Answers
By JULIA PRESTON
New immigration and the political reaction against it are nearly as old as the United States itself. Yet the immigration surge of the last decade has awakened tensions of unexpected intensity that have pervaded the presidential campaigns of both parties and stirred voter anger across the country.

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/30/us/politics/30issuesI.html
December 30, 2007
Immigration Is Defying Easy Answers
By JULIA PRESTON
New immigration and the political reaction against it are nearly as old as the United States itself. Yet the immigration surge of the last decade has awakened tensions of unexpected intensity that have pervaded the presidential campaigns of both parties and stirred voter anger across the country.
In 1960, census figures show, the largest national group of immigrants was the Italians, accounting for 13 percent of the foreign-born. Today, Mexicans account for one-third of all immigrants. Spanish-speakers make up nearly half of the 37.5 million foreign-born people in the country. Young Latino immigrants have brought Spanish to states that had had little exposure to it, like Iowa and North Carolina.
In addition, never before have illegal immigrants settled here in such numbers — an estimated 12 million. Almost 70 percent of those immigrants are Spanish-speaking, coming from Mexico and Central America, according to the Migration Policy Institute, a nonpartisan research group.
Coinciding with the mood of apprehension following the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the new immigration has provoked more than the traditional suspicion that foreigners are taking jobs from American workers. For many voters in the primary races, immigration has become an urgent national security concern and a challenge to the American identity.
The new immigration also sharpened the rift between the federal government and the states. Across party lines, frustrated voters accuse the Bush administration of failing to secure the southern border against intruders, of being lax on employers hiring illegal immigrants and of preaching assimilation without providing resources for local schools where Spanish-speaking students are enrolled.
President Bush’s failed effort to push an immigration package through Congress foreshadowed the divisions on the campaign trail. Republicans are split about how to proceed, and Democrats are treading carefully, fearful on the one hand of alienating voters in places like Iowa who are fed up with illegal immigration but concerned on the other about missing what they see as an opportunity to win the allegiance of the fast-growing Hispanic population.
The next president will still face the tricky task of negotiating not just the politics of the issue, but also some concrete realities. While border fences and immigration raids have discouraged some illegal immigrants from coming and encouraged some who are here to go home, millions of illegal workers have had families here and put down roots, and are not going to disappear.
Copyright 2007 The New York Times Company

Tapes by C.I.A. Lived and Died to Save Image

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/30/washington/30intel.html
December 30, 2007
Tapes by C.I.A. Lived and Died to Save Image
By SCOTT SHANE and MARK MAZZETTI [bush white house] [nsc principals] [well documented, if Tenet can be believed, in Tenet memoirs] [bush white house] [nsc statutory and ad hoc principals] [part of Bush’s “national security team”] [bush uses opportunity to stop stonewalling on clearences doj ethics officer to investigate NSA warrant-less spying and other TSPs] [congress] [110th, 1st session] [separation of powers] [followup] [*****] [use 455]WASHINGTON — If Abu Zubaydah, a senior operative of Al Qaeda, died in American hands, Central Intelligence Agency officers pursuing the terrorist group knew that much of the world would believe they had killed him.

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/30/washington/30intel.html
December 30, 2007
Tapes by C.I.A. Lived and Died to Save Image
By SCOTT SHANE and MARK MAZZETTI [bush white house] [nsc principals] [well documented, if Tenet can be believed, in Tenet memoirs] [bush white house] [nsc statutory and ad hoc principals] [part of Bush’s “national security team”] [bush uses opportunity to stop stonewalling on clearences doj ethics officer to investigate NSA warrant-less spying and other TSPs] [congress] [110th, 1st session] [separation of powers] [followup] [*****] [use 455]
WASHINGTON — If Abu Zubaydah, a senior operative of Al Qaeda, died in American hands, Central Intelligence Agency officers pursuing the terrorist group knew that much of the world would believe they had killed him.
So in the spring of 2002, even as the intelligence officers flew in a surgeon from Johns Hopkins Hospital to treat Abu Zubaydah, who had been shot three times during his capture in Pakistan, they set up video cameras to record his every moment: asleep in his cell, having his bandages changed, being interrogated.
In fact, current and former intelligence officials say, the agency’s every action in the prolonged drama of the interrogation videotapes was prompted in part by worry about how its conduct might be perceived [****]— by Congress, by prosecutors, by the American public and by Muslims worldwide.
That worry drove the decision to begin taping interrogations — and to stop taping just months later, after the treatment of prisoners began to include waterboarding. And it fueled the nearly three-year campaign by the agency’s clandestine service for permission to destroy the tapes, culminating in a November 2005 destruction order from the service’s director, Jose A. Rodriguez Jr. [********]
Now, the disclosure of the tapes and their destruction in 2005 have become just the public spectacle the agency had sought to avoid. To the already fierce controversy over whether the Bush administration authorized torture has been added the specter of a cover-up.
The Justice Department, the C.I.A.’s inspector general and Congress are investigating whether any official lied about the tapes or broke the law by destroying them. Still in dispute is whether any White House official encouraged their destruction and whether the C.I.A. deliberately hid them from the national Sept. 11 commission. [*****]
But interviews with two dozen current and former officials, most of whom would speak about the classified program only on the condition of anonymity, revealed new details about why the tapes were made and then eliminated. Their accounts show how political and legal considerations competed with intelligence concerns in the handling of the tapes. [******]
The discussion about the tapes took place in Congressional briefings and secret deliberations among top White House lawyers, including a meeting in May 2004 just days after photographs of abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq had reminded the administration of the power of such images. The debate stretched over the tenure of two C.I.A. chiefs and became entangled in a feud between the agency’s top lawyers and its inspector general. The tapes documented a program so closely guarded that President Bush himself had agreed with the advice of intelligence officials that he not be told the locations of the secret C.I.A. prisons. Had there been no political or security considerations, videotaping every interrogation and preserving the tapes would make sense, according to several intelligence officials.
“You couldn’t have more than one or two analysts in the room,” said A. B. Krongard, the C.I.A.’s No. 3 official at the time the interrogations were taped. “You want people with spectacular language skills to watch the tapes. You want your top Al Qaeda experts to watch the tapes. You want psychologists to watch the tapes. You want interrogators in training to watch the tapes.”
Given such advantages, why was the taping stopped by the end of 2002, less than a year after it started?
“By that time,” Mr. Krongard said, “paranoia was setting in.”
The Decision to Tape
By several accounts, the decision to begin taping Abu Zubaydah and another detainee suspected of being a Qaeda operative, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, was made in the field, with several goals in mind. [improvised under Tenet’s decentralization decision] [****]
First, there was Abu Zubaydah’s precarious condition. “There was concern that we needed to have this all documented in case he should expire from his injuries,” recalled one former intelligence official.
Just as important was the fact that for many years the C.I.A. had rarely conducted even standard interrogations, let alone ones involving physical pressure, so officials wanted to track closely the use of legally fraught interrogation methods. [*****] And there was interest in capturing all the information to be gleaned from a rare resource — direct testimony from those who had attacked the United States.
But just months later, the taping was stopped. Some field officers had never liked the idea. “If you’re a case officer, the last thing you want is someone in Washington second-guessing everything you did,” [****]said one former agency veteran.
More significant, interrogations of Abu Zubaydah had gotten rougher, with each new tactic approved by cable from headquarters. American officials have said that Abu Zubaydah was the first Qaeda prisoner to be waterboarded, a procedure during which water is poured over the prisoner’s mouth and nose to create a feeling of drowning. Officials said they felt they could not risk a public leak of a videotape showing Americans giving such harsh treatment to bound prisoners. [********]
Heightening the worries about the tapes was word of the first deaths of prisoners in American custody. In November 2002, an Afghan man froze to death overnight while chained in a cell at a C.I.A. site in Afghanistan, north of Kabul, the capital. Two more prisoners died in December 2002 in American military custody at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan.
By late 2002, interrogators were recycling videotapes, preserving only two days of tapes before recording over them, one C.I.A. officer said. Finally, senior agency officials decided that written summaries of prisoners’ answers would suffice.
Still, that decision left hundreds of hours of videotape of the two Qaeda figures locked in an overseas safe.
Clandestine service officers who had overseen the interrogations began pushing hard to destroy the tapes. But George J. Tenet, then the director of central intelligence, was wary, in part because the agency’s top lawyer, Scott W. Muller, advised against it, current and former officials said.
Yet agency officials decided to float the idea of eliminating the tapes on Capitol Hill, hoping for political cover. In February 2003, Mr. Muller told members of the House and Senate oversight committees about the C.I.A’s interest in destroying the tapes for security reasons. [****]
But both Porter J. Goss, then a Republican congressman from Florida and the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, and Representative Jane Harman of California, the ranking Democrat, thought destroying the tapes would be legally and politically risky. C.I.A. officials did not press the matter. [********]
The Detention Program
Scrutiny of the C.I.A.’s secret detention program kept building. Later in 2003, the agency’s inspector general, John L. Helgerson, began investigating the program, and some insiders believed the inquiry might end with criminal charges for abusive interrogations.
Mr. Helgerson — now conducting the videotapes review with the Justice Department — had already rankled covert officers with an investigation into the 2001 shooting down of a missionary plane by Peruvian military officers advised by the C.I.A. The investigation set off widespread concern within the clandestine branch that a day of reckoning could be coming for officers involved in the agency’s secret prison program. The Peru investigation often pitted Mr. Helgerson against Mr. Muller, who vigorously defended members of the clandestine branch and even lobbied the Justice Department to head off criminal charges in the matter, according to former intelligence officials
“Muller wanted to show the clandestine branch that he was looking out for them,” said John Radsan, who served as an assistant general counsel for the C.I.A. from 2002 to 2004. “And his aggressiveness on Peru was meant to prove to the operations people that they were protected on a lot of other programs, too.”
Mr. Helgerson completed his investigation of interrogations in April 2004, according to one person briefed on the still-secret report, which concluded that some of the C.I.A.’s techniques appeared to constitute cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment under the international Convention Against Torture. Current and former officials said the report did not explicitly state that the methods were torture.
A month later, as the administration reeled from the Abu Ghraib disclosures, Mr. Muller, the agency general counsel, met to discuss the report with three senior lawyers at the White House: Alberto R. Go